Matthew T. Gailliot

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== Curriculum Vita Media:Administrator\My Documents\vita ==



Happiness and Energy

    ATP-ADP
    carbon-to-carbon derivitables
    glucose metabolism
         - Is sertonin increasingly gliotransmitic to a greater extent than other neurotransmitters?
         Fillion, 1983. Central serotonin receptors: Regulation mechanism at the molecular level. 
                   The extent to which emotion is comprised of neuronal and gliatic activity, happy emotion, and perhaps affect, is to a greater extent associated with gliatic, rather than neuronic, activity.
                   Energy derived from neuronal and gliatic activity contributes to the experience of happy emotion, and perhaps affect. The extent of overlap between neuronal and gliatic activity correlates positively with the extent of happy experience. The extent of neuronal activity disparate from that of glia/astrocytes indicates less concomitance with emotion and happiness. 



Contents

Curriculum Vita

Matthew T. Gailliot Curriculum Vita

University of Albany 1400 Washington Avenue Social Sciences 320 Albany, NY 12222

518.442.4846 mgailliot@albany.edu

WORK HISTORY:

- Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Albany (September, 2009 – present) - Senior Fellow, Center for Human Science (May, 2009 – present) - Assistant Professor, Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam (June, 2007 – June, 2008)

EDUCATION:

- Ph.D. in Social Psychology, Florida State University (August, 2007) - M.S. in Social Psychology, Florida State University (December, 2005) - B.S. in Psychology, Honors Scholar, Summa Cum Laude, Kennesaw State University (May, 2003)

AWARDS AND HONORS:

- FSU Graduate Student Research and Creativity Award (2007) - Brigham Award for Best Research in Social Psychology by FSU graduate student, Honorable Mention (2007) - Brigham Award for Best Research in Social Psychology by FSU graduate student (2006) - Brigham Award for Best Research in Social Psychology by FSU graduate student, Honorable Mention (2005) - Travel Grant for the Annual Meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, LA (2005) - Poster Competition for the Annual Meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology, Honorable Mention, New Orleans, LA (2005) - Congress of Graduate Students Presentation Grant, Florida State University (2005) - Postdoctoral Research Award from the Human Behavior and Evolution Society, co- authored paper with Jon K. Maner (2005)


[C:\Documents and Settings\imc21\My Documents\Document.rtf Happiness]

PUBLICATIONS:

Glucose and Metabolism

Gailliot, M.T., Hildebrandt, B., Eckel, L.A., & Baumeister, R.F. (in press). A theory of limited metabolic energy and premenstrual syndrome (PMS) symptoms – Increased metabolic demands during the luteal phase divert metabolic resources from and impair self-control. General Review of Psychology.

Gailliot, M.T., Baumeister, R.F., DeWall, C.N., Maner, J.K., Plant, E.A., Tice, D.M., Brewer, L.E., & Schmeichel, B.J. (2007). Self-Control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: Willpower is more than a metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 325-336.

Gailliot, M.T., & Baumeister, R.F. (2007). The physiology of willpower: Linking blood glucose to self-control. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 303-327.

Gailliot, M. T., Peruche, B. M., Plant., E. A., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Stereotypes and prejudice in the blood: Sucrose drinks reduce prejudice and stereotyping. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 288-290.

Gailliot, M.T. (2008). Unlocking the energy dynamics of executive functioning: Linking executive functioning to brain glycogen. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 245-263.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). An increased correspondence bias with low blood-glucose: Low glucose increases heuristic thought. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Alcohol consumption reduces effortful fatigue after sleep: Testing a theory of metabolite depletion and subsequent supercompensation. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Mortality salience and metabolism: Glucose drinks reduce worldview defense caused by mortality salience. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Improved self-control associated with using relatively large amounts of glucose: Learning self-control is metabolically expensive. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). The effects of glucose drinks on self-control are not due to the taste of the drink: Glucose drinks replenish self-control. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Effortful outgroup interactions impair self-control via the depletion of glucose: The control of stereotypical thought and prejudice as metabolically expensive. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Hunger impairs and food improves self-control in the laboratory and across the world: Reducing world hunger as a self-control panacea. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Increased mimicry of energy efficient than inefficient models: Observational learning as an evolved tendency. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Happiness as surplus or freely available energy: Displays of happiness include inefficient mechanical movement – “Putting a pep in one’s step”. Submitted.

DeWall, C.N., Gailliot, M.T., Deckman, T. & Bushman, B. (2009). Low glucose and other metabolic problems increase aggression: Aggressive restraint as metabolically expensive. Submitted.


Self-Regulation

Gailliot, M.T., Schmeichel, B.J., & Baumeister, R.F. (2006). Self-regulatory processes defend against the threat of death: Effects of self-control depletion and trait self-control on thoughts and fears of dying. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 49-62.

Gailliot, M.T., & Baumeister, R.F. (2007). Self-regulation and sexual restraint: Dispositionally and temporarily poor self-regulatory abilities contribute to failures at restraining sexual behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 173-186.

Gailliot, M.T., Plant, E.A., Butz, D.A., & Baumeister, R.F. (2007). Increasing self-regulatory strength can reduce the depleting effect of suppressing stereotypes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 281-294.

DeWall, C. N., Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., & Maner, J. K. (2008). Depletion makes the heart grow less helpful: Helping as a function of self-regulatory energy and genetic relatedness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1653-1662.

DeWall, C.N., Baumeister, R.F., Stillman, T., & Gailliot, M.T. (2007). Violence restrained: Effects of self-regulation and its depletion on aggression. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 62-76.

Baumeister, R.F., Gailliot, M., DeWall, C.N., & Oaten, M. (2006). Self-regulation and personality: How interventions increase regulatory success, and how depletion moderates the effects of traits on behavior. Journal of Personality, 74, 1773-1801.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). The effortful and energy-demanding nature of prosocial behavior. In Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (Eds.) Prosocial motives, feelings, and behavior – The better angels of our nature. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Gailliot, M.T. (2007). Self-control measures. In R.F. Baumeister & K.D. Vohs (Eds.), Encyclopedia of social psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gailliot, M.T. (2007). Controlled processes. In R.F. Baumeister & K.D. Vohs (Eds.), Encyclopedia of social psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gailliot, M.T., Baumeister, R.F., & Mead, N. (2008). Self-regulation. O.P. John, R.W. Robins, & L.A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research (3rd Edition, pp. 472-491). New York: Guilford.

Gailliot, M.T., & Tice, D.M (2007). Emotion regulation and impulse control: People succumb to their impulses in order to feel better. In K. Vohs & E. Finkel (Eds.), Interpersonal relations and intrapsychic processes. NY: Guilford.

Gailliot, M.T., & Baumeister, R.F. (2005). Self-control and business ethics: How strengthening the self benefits the corporation and the individual. In R. A. Giacalone, C. L. Jurkiewicz, & C. Dunn (Eds.), Positive Psychology, Ethics, and Social Responsibility in Organizational Life. Greenwich, CT: Information Age.

DeWall, C.N., Baumeister, R.F., Schurtz, D.R., & Gailliot, M.T. (in press). Acting on limited resources: The interactive effects of self-regulatory depletion and individual differences. In R. Hoyle (Ed.), Handbook of personality and self-regulation. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.

Gailliot, M.T., & Baumeister, R.F. (2009). Race, crime, intellectual performance – and food: Poor nutrition contributes to racial differences in violence and SAT scores. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T., & Zell, A.L. (2009). Self-regulation to maintain moderate self views: Prior self-regulation increases biases related to self-esteem. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T., Baumeister, R.F., Gitter, S., & Baker, M. (2009). Breaking the rules: Low trait or state self-control increases social norm violations. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Having used self-control increases criminality. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Action and passivity as proportional to available self-control (metabolic) energy: Self-control use, diabetes, and action. Submitted.


Mortality Salience

Gailliot, M.T., Stillman, T., Schmeichel, B.J., Plant, E.A., & Maner, J.K. (2008). Mortality salience increases adherence to cultural norms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 993-1003.

Gailliot, M.T., Schmeichel, B.J., & Maner, J.K. (2007). Differentiating the effects of self-control and self-esteem on reactions to mortality salience. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology, 43, 894-901.

Gailliot, M.T., & Baumeister, R.F. (2007). Self-esteem, belongingness, and worldview validation: Does belongingness exert a unique influence upon self-esteem? Journal of Research in Personality, 41, 327-345.

Schmeichel, B. J., Gailliot, M. T., Filardo, E-A., McGregor, I., Gitter, S., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Terror management theory and self-esteem revisited: The roles of implicit and explicit self-esteem in mortality salience effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 1077-1087.

McGregor, I., & Gailliot, M.T. (in press). Zealous reactions to mortality salience: Clarifying the role of explicit self-esteem. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.

McGregor, I., Gailliot, M. T., Vasquez, N., Nash, K. A. (2007). Ideological and personal zeal reactions to threat among people with high self-esteem: Motivated promotion focus. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1587-1599.

Gailliot, M.T., & Rutjens, B. (2009). Entropy activates thoughts of death. In preparation.


Attention

Maner, J. K., Miller, S. L., Gailliot, M. T., & Rouby, D. A. (2009). Intrasexual Vigilance: The Implicit Cognition of Romantic Rivalry. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 74-87.

Maner, J. K., Gailliot, M. T., & Miller, S. L. (2009). The implicit cognition of relationship maintenance: Inattention to attractive alternatives. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 174-179.

Maner , J. K., DeWall, C. N., & Gailliot, M. T. (2008). Selective attention to signs of success: Social dominance and early stage interpersonal perception. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34 , 488-501.

Maner, J.K., Gailliot, M.T., & DeWall, C.N. (2007). Can’t take my eyes off you: Mating goals and biases in attentional adhesion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 389-401.

Maner, J.K., Gailliot, M.T., & DeWall, C.N. (2007). Adaptive attentional attunement: Evidence for mating-related perceptual bias. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28, 28-36.

Maner, J.K., Denoma, J.M., Van Orden, K.A., Gailliot, M.T., Gordon, K.H., & Joiner T.E. (2006). Evidence of attentional bias in women exhibiting bulimotypic symptoms. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 39, 55-61.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Having used self-control increases attention to food: A functional bias in the management of metabolic energy and a bias toward indulgence. Submitted.


Additional Topics

Gailliot, M.T., & Schmeichel, B.J. (2006). Is implicit self-esteem really unconscious?: Implicit self-esteem eludes conscious reflection. Journal of Articles in Support of the Null Hypothesis, 3, 73-83.

Tice, D.M., & Gailliot, M.T. (2006). How self-esteem relates to the ills and triumphs of society. In M.H. Kernis (Ed.), Self-esteem issues and answers: A sourcebook on current perspectives. New York: Psychology Press.

Maner, J.K., & Gailliot, M.T. (2007). Altruism and egoism: Prosocial motivations for helping depend on relationship context. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 347-358.

Maner, J.K., Gailliot, M.T., Butz, D.A., & Peruche, M. (2007). Power, risk, and the status quo: Does power promote riskier or more conservative decision making? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 451-462.

Gau, L. S., Gailliot, M. T., & Brady, M. (2007). A model examining relationships among team identification, sport spectators' motives, perceived service quality, and satisfaction. In J. D. James (Ed.), Sport Marketing Across the Spectrum: Research from Emerging, Developing, and Established Scholars, Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology, Inc.

Maner, J. K., Gailliot, M. T., & Rouby, A. (2005). Deal makers or deal breakers? Does emphasizing partner strengths or deemphasizing partner shortcomings promote positive relationship outcomes? Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T., Gau, L.S., & Stillman, T.F. (2009). “That line’s got personality!” – The Big 5 as a model of personality perception. Submitted.

Gailliot, M.T. (2009). Does simple understanding take much energy?: Biases in distance perception suggest the effort of meaning. Submitted.


PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS:

Gailliot, M. (Fall, 2009). Self-control etc. and Metabolism: The Self as Energy Defined. Department of Psychology, Harvard University, December, 2009.

Gailliot, M. (Fall, 2009). The Metabolic Organism Within: Thought and Behavior as Determined by Energy Dynamics. Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, September, 2009.

Gailliot, M. (Spring, 2008). Effortful Psychological Processes and Glucose in the Bloodstream: How ‘Fuel for the Brain’ in the Blood Shapes the Social World. Symposium presentation at the annual meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Gailliot, M. (Spring, 2008). The Psyche as Energy. Talk on viewing psychology from an energy perspective, Department of Social Psychology, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, January 2008.

Gailliot, M. (Fall, 2007). The Psyche as Energy. Talk on viewing psychology from an energy perspective, Department of Marketing, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium, November 2007.

Gailliot, M. (Fall, 2007). The Psyche as Energy. Talk on viewing psychology from an energy perspective, Department of Social Psychology, University of Cologne, Germany, December, 2007.

Maner, J., Miller, S., & Gailliot, M. (June, 2007). Mate-guarding, jealousy, and intrasexual vigilance. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society, Williamsburg, VA.

Gailliot, M.T., Baumeister, R.F., DeWall, C.N., Maner, J.K., Plant, E.A., Tice, D.M., Brewer, L.E., & Schmeichel, B.J. (2007, January). Self-Control relies on glucose as an energy source: Glucose fuels the self-regulatory engine. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology, Memphis, TN.

Gau, L.S., & Gailliot, M.T. (2006, November). A model examining relationships among team identification, sport spectator motives, perceived service quality, and satisfaction. Paper presented at the Sport Marketing Association IV Conference, Denver, Colorado.

Gau, L.S., & Gailliot, M.T. (2006, October). Understanding the meanings and functions of game rituals and team symbols and mascots in spectator sports across cultures. Poster presented at the 8th Annual Florida State University Sport Management Conference, Tallahassee, Florida.

Vohs, K.D., & Gailliot, M.T. (2006, September). Using or losing self-control: Antecedents of regulatory strength and regulatory depletion. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Consumer Research, Orlando, FL.

Gailliot, M.T., Baumeister, R.F., DeWall, C.N., Maner, J.K., Plant, E.A., Tice, D.M., Brewer, L.E., & Schmeichel, B.J. (2006, May). Self-Control Relies on glucose as a limited energy source: Willpower is more than a metaphor. Paper presented at Florida State University Graduate Research Day, Tallahassee, FL.

Gailliot, M.T., & Baumeister, R.F. (2006, January). Self-regulation and sexual restraint: Dispositionally and temporarily poor self-regulatory abilities contribute to failures at restraining sexual behavior. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology meeting, Palm Springs, CA.

Gailliot, M.T., Plant, E.A., Butz, D.A., & Baumeister, R.F. (2005, May). Increasing self-regulatory strength can reduce the depleting effect of suppressing stereotypes. Poster presented at Graduate Research Day, Tallahassee, FL.

Maner, J. K., & Gailliot, M. T. (2005, June). Can't take my eyes off you: Mating goals and biases in attentional adhesion. Paper presented at the meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society, Austin, TX.

Maner, J. K., Denoma, J. M., Van Orden, K. A., Gailliot, M. T., Gordon, K. H., & Joiner T. E. (2005, June). Female physical attractiveness, intrasexual competition, and disordered eating. Poster presented at the meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society, Austin, TX.

Gailliot, M. T., Plant. E. A., Butz, D. A., & Baumeister, R. F. (2005, January). Increasing self-regulatory strength can reduce the depleting effect of suppressing stereotypes. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology meeting, New Orleans, LA.

Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., DeWall, C. N. (2004, October). Is there anything good about men? Paper presented at the International Positive Psychology Summit, Washington, D. C.

Gailliot, M. T., & Ziegler, C. W. (2003, April). “Is parking really that bad?”: Developing an understanding of the relationships between students’ characteristics and their attitudes. Paper presented at the Georgia Undergraduate Research in Psychology conference, Kennesaw, GA.

Gailliot, M.T. (2003, March). A test of the Distinctiveness Heuristic through recognition of word lists and additional stimuli. Paper presented at the Southeastern Psychological Association conference, New Orleans, LA.

Gailliot, M.T. (2002, April). What were you thinking?: Assessing the Mere Exposure Effect through ratings of attractiveness. Poster presented at the Georgia Undergraduate Research in Psychology conference, Kennesaw, GA.


TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

 - Director, Summer Internship, Center for Human Science (Summer, 2009) 

- Honors Research Experience Instructor, Mortality Salience and Color (Spring, 2008) - Course Instructor, Emotions and Cognition (Spring, 2008) - Course Instructor, Thoughts and Behavior – An Energy Perspective (Fall, 2007) - Supervised Research Instructor, Self-Control, Vegetarianism, and the Environment (Fall, 2007) - Baumeister-Tice Social Psychology Laboratory Manager (2005 – 2007) - Course Instructor, General Psychology (Spring, 2006) - Course Instructor, General Psychology (Fall, 2005) - Course Instructor, General Psychology (Summer, 2005) - Teaching Assistant, General Psychology, supervisor Dr. Dianne M. Tice (Spring, 2005) - Teaching Assistant, General Psychology, supervisor Dr. Dianne M. Tice (Spring, 2004) - Teaching Assistant, Social Psychology, supervisor Dr. Roy F. Baumeister (Fall, 2003) - Teaching Assistant, Careers in Psychology, supervisor Dr. Barb Licht (Fall, 2003)

TALKS

--Gailliot 09:33, 22 February 2010 (PST)

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What do I research?

Hypotheses - To accompany Metabolic Theory of Schizophrenia

    Hypoglycemia, or lowered glucose, may predispose to symptomology via fluctuations in neurotransmitters. Serotonin, for example, may experience disrupted and facilitated production in step with energy availability and availability/dissipation curves.


Multi(er)causality of laugh - or is meaning obscured?



Glucose and Learning

    Astrocytic activity influences genesis (Christopherson et al., 2005) and stabilization of synapses (Ullian et al., 2001).
    It is widely accepted, among scientists, that associative synaptic plasticity in cortical pyramidal cells . . . "Associative synaptic plasticity in cortical pyramidal cells is the most widely accepted  cellular model of learning." (Lorincz & Nusser, 2010)

Lorincz, A., & Nusser, Z. (2010). Molecular identity of dendritic voltage-gated sodium channels. Science, 328, 906-910(ish). Christopherson, K.S., Ullian, E.M., Stokes, C.C., Mullowney, C.E., Hell J.W., Agah, A., Lawler, J., Mosher D. F., Bornstein, P., & Barres, B., A. (2005). Thrombospondins are astrocyte-secreted proteins that promote CNS synaptogensis. Cell 120 421-433

My research

Does Want of Resource Render Resource-Contingents Important?: Focal Thought Content Incurs Stronger Judgments of Importance with Held Breath or Hunger

Abstract Might that of focal thought be more important when the resources on which such psychology relies are of want? The prediction was increased importance for targets of thought with want of air or food. Resource for process are of want, yet process occurs, therefore that which is processed must be more important. Ratings of importance for a potpourri of items increased among participants who held their breath while rating those items, relative to ratings of participants who breathed normally (Study 1). Self-reported hunger correlated positively with ratings of importance of thought content (Study 2).



Does Want of Resource Render Resource-Contingents Important?: Focal Thought Content Incurs Stronger Judgments of Importance with Held Breath or Hunger What might sighs, choking, pouting, ‘hmmph!’, and the phrases, “You take my breath away” and “Don’t hold your breath,” have in common? All might pertain to the strengthening of perceptions of importance by reducing resource availability. The child holds his breath, reducing air intake, until red in the face, to signal the importance of his desire for a candy bar. A ‘hmmph!’ declares the import of being wronged socially by blowing out air. Basic economic, or resource, theory and physiological fact raises the hypothesis that resource want increases the perceived importance of focal thought. Psychological process requires air (e.g., oxygen) and food (e.g., glucose). To the extent that these resources are low or of halted incoming, then the content of consciousness may be perceived as more important. The resource on which such information relies is of want, yet the information is processed and therefore must be more important. The strongest theoretical support may be derived from an understanding of extreme resource want, such as during breathing deprivation or starvation. Upon starvation or preclusion of breath, attention likely would orient immediately and continuously toward obtainment of food or air - definitively important thought. The hypothesized economic theory of importance posits relationship between resource and resource-contingents as requiring: 1) positive directionality of relationship between resource and contingent (e.g., lack of cerebral metabolites derived from food or air holds relationship with lack of thought), and 2) resource as fueling the contingent - the contingent consumes the resource (e.g., thought consumes food and air metabolites). Air and food are resources for thought, therefore want of air or food is predicted to increase perceived importance of focal thought. The hypothesis that follows is: If a is resource for b, then want of a increases perceived importance of b. In the current work, a is defined as air (Study 1) and food (Study 2), whereas b is defined as the content of focal thought. The aim was to use such view to advance theory on judgment and decisions of importance. Judgments of importance have been studied in the context of, or relate to, a breadth of topics, including major life needs and work (Porter, 1963), consumer product and effort (Cardozo, 1965), thought accessibility and self-esteem (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004), disease and health (Benyamini, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 2003), and life and death (Steinhauser, Christakis, Clipp, McNeilly, McIntyre, & Tulsky, 2000). These findings are vaguely consistent with the current hypothesis yet only loosely relevant and, according to the requirements of a resource-contingent relationship, inapplicable. That the extant literature on importance judgments pertains little to the current hypothesis suggests its novelty. Resource or economic models are widely applicable, indicating potentially high value of this work. The hypothesis of increased importance for contingents with resource want is competitive - alternative and opposing theory may be suggested. Resource want may, plausibly, reduce the perceived importance of contingents because there is less energy for it. Or, reduced importance may function to reduce resource use. Study 1 - Increased Importance with Breath Held Air is a common, widespread resource. From the air we derive oxygen that affords psychological thought. The dynamics of air, breathing, and psychological process are absent from many psychological journals and texts. The study of air as influential resource on judgment therefore is of worth. Participants rated the importance of various items - in current focal attention - while either holding their breath or breathing normally. Air is, in a sense, of want with held breath, but to a lesser extent with normal breathing. Because air is a resource for focal thought, holding one’s breath, relative to breathing normally, was predicted to increase the perceived importance of focal thought and, hence, rated importance for items. Method Participants. The researcher approached individuals in frequented public areas with invite to complete a questionnaire activity. Forty-one individuals who agreed to participate constituted the final sample. Procedure. The author developed a questionnaire in English that was subsequently translated into Turkish. The questionnaire included 10 items that varied in importance (in order of presentation - a loaf of bread, a speck of dirt, human life, the life of a cat, the life of a fly, a frying pan, pigeon poop, the appendix, the heart, water) and instructions to rate each item on the extent of its importance, using a 7-point scale (1 - not at all important, 4 - somewhat important, 7 - very important), making response on a line preceding each item. Instructions indicated to either hold one’s breath while completing the questionnaire or to breath normally. Results and Discussion Participants who held their breath rated the items (M = 5.22, SD = 1.55) as more important than did participants who breathed normally (M = 4.80, SD = .75), t(39) = 1.65, p = .05. The want of air, while holding one’s breath, may have increased the importance of the items because their psychological representation and processing occurred despite resource want. A separate study on the hiccups provided converging evidence. Participants who reported typically holding their breath as a technique to rid themselves of the hiccups rated the hiccups as being more important (M = 5.33, SD = 1.75) than did participants who reported typically doing nothing to rid themselves of the hiccups (M = 2.67, SD = 1.61), F (1, 38) = 17.70, p = .00. Hiccupping likely is in focal attention while hiccupping, and so it is possible that want of air from breath holding contributed to the increased importance of the hiccups. Study 2 - Hunger Correlates Positively with Thought Importance Study 2 provides a test to avoid the alternative explanation that the resource want–thought importance link is due to effort. Breath holding may increase thought importance because it requires more effort, and greater invested effort in something renders it more important. Study 2 relates thought importance to hunger. The prediction was that increased hunger would predict increased perceived importance of current thought. It is unclear how this result could be explained by effort. Every thought and behavior relies on glucose - derived from food. With hunger, the resource on which psychological process occurs is of want. Participants were asked to report their current hunger and the importance of what they were thinking about. Because food is a resource for focal thought, the extent of self-reported hunger is predicted to correlate positively with self-report ratings of the importance of current thought. Method Participants. The researcher approached individuals in frequented public areas in Turkey and at a university with invite to complete a questionnaire. Ninety-one individuals who agreed to participate constituted the final sample. Procedure. The survey contained three questions, appearing in both English and Turkish: 1) How hungry are you?, 2) What are you thinking about?, and 3) How important is that which you are thinking about?. Responses to items 1 and 3 were made by circling a response on a 7-point scale (1 - not at all, 7 - very). Responses to item 2 were open-ended. Item 1 and items 2 and 3 were counterbalanced across participants. The researcher handed the questionnaire to participants and requested that they complete it. Results and Discussion Ratings of hunger correlated significantly and positively with ratings of thought importance, r(89) = .26, p < .05. Want of food - greater hunger - related to stronger ratings of importance of thought content. The strength of the correlation between hunger and thought importance differed nonsignificantly between counterbalancing conditions, z = .78, ns, and between participants who either did or did not report thinking about food, z = 1.07, ns. The latter suggests that the relationship between hunger and thought importance was not attributable to hungry participants thinking about eating. General Discussion Want of resource may increase the perceived importance of resource-contingents that concurrently consume resource. Want of air - in the form of holding one’s breath (Study 1) - and of food - in the form of hunger (Study 2), were either causally or correlationally linked to increased self-reported importance of items in focal thought. The findings may be applicable to several domains. One example may be self-esteem as resource for anxiety avoidance (Pyszczynski et al., 2004), with self-esteem allowing avoidance of anxiety and experiencing anxiety as reducing self-esteem. From theory suggested in the current work, want of self-esteem (e.g., low or decreased self-esteem) is predicted to increase importance of anxiety avoidance (e.g., conservation of resources for anxiety avoidance, altered thought and behavior so as to avoid anxiety). That want of resource increases importance of contingents may explain emotion. Stifled breathing during anxiety may augment perceived importance of anxiety-evoking thought or threat. Rumination may occur among the sad because lack of energy incurs import to depleting or low energy cognition. Low glucose and other energy-limiting metabolic factors might increase aggression (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007) by highlighting focal, aggression-consistent thought. Drinking alcohol can reduce glucose in both the bloodstream (Kokavec & Crowe, 2003) and brain (Zhu, Volkow, Ma, Fowler, & Wang, 2004), which suggests a mechanism through which salient environmental or internal stimuli become importantly myopic (Steele & Josephs, 1990). Using self-control depletes self-control resource (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), or glucose (Gailliot, Baumeister, et al., 2007), potentially signaling the importance of engaged in self-regulatory process, consistent with larger decreases in blood-glucose during the Stroop task predicting larger increases in learning (Gailliot, 2009). People learn that which they perceive as important. Thoughts of food and weight may bombard in psychological importance among people experiencing anorexia or bulimia (e.g., after purging), thereby promoting continued disorder. Cigarettes may increase in importance due to holding one’s breath while smoking. The businessperson may more capably shift importance among the hungered client on mountaintop (lower oxygen) than among the well-fed at sea level. The current work has its limitation. The theory on want and importance may be less applicable to nonconscious or automatic judgments because they may require less energetic resource. Greater specificity may be achieved by delineating the precise resource (e.g., whole brain glucose metabolism or neuronal want). Due to vomiting of undigested foodstuff, the toilet may be the strongest cue to the importance of sobriety among drinkers of food-empty stomach. The punch to head - and accompanying halting of typical breath - aggrandizes thought of retaliation within the boxer. ‘Take heed, my importance!’, the perpetrator screams metaphorically at mind of stabbed victim, blood pooling on ground. On final breath of life, is departing thought meaningfully important, or mundane? The want of resource – such as for breath or food – may have shaped human nature and culture via economics of the salient, potent mind. In closing, life occurs via the resource of existence - want of existence renders life meaningfully important, the death trivial among those without.










References Benyamini, Y., Leventhal, E. A., & Leventhal, H. (2003). Elderly people’s ratings of the importance of health-related factors to their self-assessments of health. Social Science and Medicine, 56, 8, 1661-1667. Cardozo, R. N. (1965). An experimental study of customer effort, expectation and satisfaction. Journal of Marketing Research, 2, 244-249. Gailliot, M. T. (2009). Improved self-control associated with using relatively large amounts of glucose: Learning self-control is metabolically expensive. Submitted. Gailliot, M.T., & Baumeister, R.F. (2007). The physiology of willpower: Linking blood glucose to self-control. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 303-327. Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., Plant, E. A., Tice, D. M., Brewer, L. E., & Schmeichel, B. J. (2007). Self-Control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: Willpower is more than a metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 325-336. Kokavec, A., & Crowe, S. F. (2003). Effect on plasma insulin and plasma glucose of consuming white wine alone after a meal. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 27, 1718-1723. Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126, 247–259. Porter, L. W. (1963). Job attitudes in management: II. Perceived importance of needs as a function of job level. Journal of Applied Psychology, 47, 2, 141-148. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., & Schimel, J. (2004). Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 435-468. Steele, C. M., & Josephs, R. A. (1990). Alcohol myopia: Its prized and dangerous effects. American Psychologist, 8, 921-933. Steinhauser, K. E., Christakis, N. A., Clipp, E. C., McNeilly, M., McIntyre, L., & Tulsky, J. A. (2000). Factors considered important at the end of life by patients, family, physicians, and other care providers. Journal of American Medical Association, 284, 19, 2476-2482. Zhu, W., Volkow, N. D., Ma, Y., Fowler, J. S., & Wang, G.-J. (2004). Relationships between ethanol-induced changes in brain regional metabolism and its motor, behavioural and cognitive effects. Alcohol and Alcoholism, 39, 53-58.





Heuristic Thought Fluctuates with Blood-Glucose Levels – Lower Metabolic Energy Predisposes to Simplistic Thought

Matthew T. Gailliot University at Albany

Bastiaan Rutjens Iris K. Schneider University of Amsterdam


The brain uses glucose as a primary source of metabolic energy. Extremely low glucose can result in brain damage or death, and hence evolutionary selection has ensured a constant supply of glucose to the brain. A textbook assumption widely accepted in the biological sciences thus is that changes in glucose availability typically are relatively minor and do not influence many subprocesses within the organism, such as psychological thought (Booth, 1994). The current reports evidence that falsifies this assumption. One of the most widely studied and well-established ideas in psychology is that of mental heuristics. People conserve mental energy by frequently using quick mental shortcuts and resource-efficient strategies. The current hypothesis was that heuristic thought would fluctuate with glucose levels in the bloodstream, being more likely when glucose levels are lower.

Study 1 – Increased Correspondence Bias with Lower Blood-Glucose One popular and robust heuristic is the correspondence bias – people underestimate the influence of external factors when judging personality (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). An initial experiment showed that lower blood-glucose levels among 70 undergraduates predicted a larger correspondence bias. Lower measurements of glucose in a blood droplet from the finger (69 < mg/dLs > 156) predicted increased ratings of the extent to which a woman shown talking during a video appeared to be an anxious person, when she was said to be discussing topics likely to induce anxiety (e.g., sexual fantasies), r(39) = -.39, p < .05, but not when discussing neutral topics (e.g., good books), r = .09, p = .67 (z = 1.89, p < .05). Lower glucose thus predicted failures in correcting for situational factors (the anxious topics) when making attributions about another’s behavior.

Study 2 – Increased Primacy in Impression Formation After Having Completed a Glucose-Depleting Task People save mental energy by quickly forming impressions of others. A self-regulatory task known to deplete blood-glucose (Gailliot et al., 2007) increased primacy in impression formation – a shortcut in judgment. Specifically, 143 undergraduates who had (v had not) stared at a podium and suppressed all emotional expression while watching a 15 minute comedy video subsequently formed stronger initial impressions, rather than considering all information. Ratings of introversion-extraversion for a person described in a paragraph as introverted and in another as extraverted (Landau et al., 2004) were determined by the order in which participants had read the paragraphs and whether they had regulated their attention and emotions, F (1, 137) = 6.03, p < .05. The first paragraph tended to shape judgments (e.g., having read the introverted paragraph first increased ratings of introversion) – but only among participants who had self-regulated previously, F (1, 73) = 5.91, p < .05, and not among those who had watched the video normally, F (1, 66) = 1.07, p = .30.

Study 3 – Reduced Heuristic Thought After Having Imbibed a Glucose Drink A final study showed that consuming a sugar drink reduced heuristic thought – ignoring base rate information when estimating probability and assuming probability based on the ease with which relevant examples come to mind (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005) – therefore providing direct causal evidence for the hypothesis. Among 30 respondents in a park, a double-blind procedure showed that those who had consumed a drink that did, rather than did not, contain glucose (Sprite v Sprite-Zero) were less prone to rate more likely a tennis player’s losing the first set but winning the match (less probable outcome), rather than losing the first set alone, and were less prone to rate salient causes of death (e.g., homicide) as being more likely than less salient, yet equally frequent, causes (e.g., Diabetes), t(28) = 2.70, p = .01. General Discussion Heuristics often are described in the social sciences as relying on vague or mysterious ‘mental resources’. Here, we pinpoint these resources as tangible glucose. Individual or transient differences in metabolism (e.g., diabetes, premenstrual syndrome) may influence heuristic thought – whether people are either controlled and effortful or heuristic thinkers. The assumption that typical changes in glucose do not influence psychological thought is justified no longer. Heuristic thought fluctuated with normal blood-glucose levels, increased after completing everyday tasks that deplete glucose, and decreased after people consumed a common sugar drink.

References

Booth, D. (1994). The psychology of nutrition. London: Taylor & Francis. Gailliot, M.T., Baumeister, R.F., DeWall, C.N., Maner, J.K., Plant, E.A., Tice, D.M., Brewer, L.E., & Schmeichel, B.J. (2007). Self-Control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: Willpower is more than a metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 325-336. Gilbert, D., T., Krull, D. S., & Pelham, B. W. (1988). Of thoughts unspoken: Social inference and the self-regulation of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 685-694. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attributed substitution in intuitive judgment. In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds), pp. 49-81. New York: Cambridge. Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2005). A model of heuristic judgment. In The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, K. Holyoak & R.G. Morrison (Eds.), pp. 267-294. Cambridge: Cambridge. Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., et al. (2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1136- 1150.




Self-Regulation to Maintain Moderate Self Views: Prior Self-Regulation Increases Biases Related to Self-Esteem

Matthew T. Gailliot University of Albany

Anne L. Zell Augustana College

Abstract High self-esteem is associated with biases in which the person overestimates their positivity, whereas low self-esteem is associated with underestimations of one’s positivity. The current study examined whether these biases emerge more strongly when self-regulation is impaired. Participants first completed a task that either did or did not require self-regulation. They later interacted with another participant and indicated the extent to which they viewed themselves as having behaved positively during the interaction and to which the other participant viewed them positively. Higher self-esteem predicted a greater bias in overestimating the extent to which the other person viewed one positively, but this relationship was strongest among participants who had completed the self-regulatory task. Past work has found that self-regulating impairs self-regulation later on. These findings therefore suggest that self-regulation is a mechanism through which personal biases are avoided and moderate views are maintained.

    Self-esteem is associated with a host of interpersonal biases that may not be reflected in objective reality (e.g., having better social skills, Buhrmester, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reis, 1988; Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). The current work examined the extent to which biases related to self-esteem are moderated by self-regulation (or self-control). In particular, we examined whether impaired self-regulation would increase biases in self-esteem related to being viewed positively by others.

High self-esteem is associated with viewing oneself favorably across many domains, yet objective evidence indicates that these favorable self-views do not match reality. For instance, people with high self-esteem tend to view themselves as more physically attractive than people with low self-esteem (Harter, 1993). Others’ ratings of physical attractiveness, however, show that people with high self-esteem are equally attractive as those with low self-esteem (Diener, Wolsic, & Fujita, 1995; Gabriel, Critelli, & Ee, 1994). Similarly, high self-esteem is associated with a bias to view oneself as being thinner than objective evidence indicates (Miller & Downey, 1999). People with high self-esteem also tend to think of themselves as being smarter than people with low self-esteem, yet objective intelligence tests show no differences based on self-esteem (Gabriel et al., 1994). The current work examined biases in being perceived positively by others. People with high self-esteem believe they are more likeable or popular than people with low self-esteem (Battistich, Solomon, & Delucchi, 1993; Frone, 2000; Glendinning & Inglis, 1999), but their beliefs are not confirmed by objective measures (Bishop & Inderbitzen, 1995; Heatherton & Vohs, 2000). One study, for instance, found that popularity ratings of students by their teachers showed no relationship to self-esteem (Adams, Ryan, Ketsetzis, & Keating, 2000). In studies in which participants interacted with one another, people with high self-esteem indicated that they were more liked or viewed more positively by others than did people with low self-esteem, yet likeability and positivity ratings showed no differences based on self-esteem (Brockner & Lloyd, 1986; Campbell & Fehr, 1990). The current work examined whether biases in positivity are influenced by self-regulation. Self-regulation is the capacity to control one’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. One common belief is that people should maintain moderate views (e.g., see Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005) and avoid viewing themselves either as largely superior or inferior to others. We reasoned that biased views emerge from time to time, but that self-regulatory processes operate to enable people to view themselves in more realistic or moderate terms. Biased views regarding the self should become stronger if self-regulation is impaired. Ample work demonstrates that using self-regulation impairs self-regulation afterwards (for reviews, see Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Gailliot, 2009; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), likely because self-regulating can deplete glucose in the bloodstream needed for later self-regulation (Fairclough & Houston, 2004; Gailliot et al., 2007; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). To the extent that personal biases are moderated by self-regulation, they should be influenced by prior self-regulatory acts. Indeed, some work has found that self-regulating caused later increases in personal biases, including narcissistic views (Vohs et al., 2005) and the self-serving bias (i.e., taking credit for good outcomes and avoiding blame for bad outcomes; Vohs, 2004). In the current work, we hypothesized that biases in perceived self-positivity would be stronger among people with high self-esteem and weaker among people with low self-esteem when self-regulation was impaired by prior use. Another basis for the hypothesis is that self-regulating increases confirmatory information processing (Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007). After having self-regulated, people with high self-esteem may increasingly seek out information that confirms their self-perceived greatness, whereas people with low self-esteem may seek out information that confirms their negative self-views. A competing hypothesis, however, is that self-regulation is used to maintain positive illusions (Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007). One therefore might expect self-regulation to be influential among people with low self-esteem – who might use self-regulation to maintain positive views – but not among people with high self-esteem. Participants first completed a task that either did or did not require self-regulation and then interacted with another participant. After the interaction, they indicated the extent to which they viewed positively their interaction partner and to which they perceived their partner as having viewed them positively. We predicted that participants with high self-esteem would overestimate how positively they were viewed, whereas participants with low self-esteem would underestimate how positively they were viewed, but that this relationship would be stronger among participants who had (v. had not) self-regulated. Method Thirty-two (20 women, 12 men) college undergraduates participated in fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants completed a measure of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) during a mass testing session at the start of the semester. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale contains 10 items (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.”) answered on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores on this measure indicate higher self-esteem. Participants attended a laboratory session later in the semester. They first completed a task that either did or did not require self-regulation. Specifically, participants watched a 6-minute video of a woman talking (without sound) in which neutral words appeared in the corner of the screen. Participants and interaction partners randomly assigned to the attention control condition were asked to avoid looking at the words and to focus their attention on the woman’s face. Attention orients automatically to novel stimuli appearing in the environment (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), and so the task required the self-regulation of attention to avoid looking at the words. Participants and interaction partners randomly assigned to the watch normally condition were asked to watch the video as they would normally, which required little or no self-regulation. After the video ended, participants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). The BMIS contains 20 items indicative of mood (e.g., happy, sad) and arousal (e.g., peppy, drowsy). Participants rated each item to indicate how they were feeling at the present moment, using a scale from 1 (definitely do not feel) to 7 (definitely feel). After the video task, participants were introduced to their interaction partner (another participant). They were given five topics (i.e., academic majors, origins and family, stress, a happy memory, and self-change) to discuss during a 5-minute conversation with one another. After the conversation, participants completed (in individual rooms) a questionnaire in which they evaluated themselves and their partner on various dimensions. The questionnaire asked participants to rate themselves and their interaction partner on the extent to which they were self-centered, arrogant, friendly, nice, polite, judgmental, and unfriendly during the interaction, using a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). Results Positivity. We created a measure of positively biased self-evaluation by creating composite measures of ratings (i.e., self-ratings of friendly, nice, and polite, and – reverse scored – self-centered, arrogant, judgmental, and unfriendly) for the extent to which participants viewed themselves positively (α = .82) and to which they were viewed positively by their interaction partner (α = .87). The difference between these two composites (i.e., self-positivity – partner-positivity) indicated one’s positivity bias, with larger scores indicating larger overestimations of the extent to which one was viewed positively. Self-esteem scores correlated with the extent of positivity bias, r(32) = .39, p < .05. Higher self-esteem was associated with overestimating the extent to which the self was rated positively, whereas lower self-esteem was associated with underestimating the extent to which the self was rated positively. This finding is consistent with past work showing biases in self-perception based on self-esteem (e.g., Battistich et al., 1993; Frone, 2000; Glendinning & Inglis, 1999). To examine whether the positivity bias differed as a function of self-esteem, we conducted a regression analysis that predicted positivity bias from self-esteem scores, video condition (attention control v. watch normally), sex, and all higher-order interactions. Sex was included because self-esteem scores were found to differ by sex in one condition. The analyses indicated a significant interaction between self-esteem scores and video condition, β = 4.18, t = 2.15, p < .05. Correlational analyses (controlling for sex) indicated that the relationship between positivity bias and self-esteem scores was significant in the attention control condition, r(11) = .86, p < .001, but not in the watch normally condition, p > .21. The correlations in the two conditions were significantly different from each other, z = -2.11, p < .05. Thus, the positivity bias was stronger among participants who had previously self-regulated. Mood valence and arousal. Mood valence and arousal did not differ by video condition, Fs < .20, ps > .65. Moreover, the relationship between positivity bias and self-esteem scores was significant in the attention control condition even when also controlling for mood valence and arousal, r(9) = .84, p < .001, but not in the watch normally condition, p > .15. This suggests that the obtained results were not attributable to the video task having influenced mood or arousal. Discussion The current study found that self-esteem predicted biases in estimating the extent to which others viewed oneself positively, but that this relationship was strongest among participants who had previously self-regulated. High self-esteem was associated with overestimating the extent to which another person ascribed positive traits to the person, whereas low self-esteem was associated with underestimating ascribed positivity, yet this tendency was stronger after participants had self-regulated. These findings suggest that self-regulation is used to maintain moderate views about the self. When self-regulation is impaired by prior use, biases emerge, as people return to their dominant, habitual modes of thought. People high in self-esteem might regulate their self-views to avoid being arrogant or narcissistic (see Vohs et al., 2005), whereas people low in self-esteem might regulate their views so as to avoid being unrealistically negative about the self (e.g., following societal standards to avoid derogating the self and view the self positively). Some work indicates that self-regulation is used to maintain positive views (Fischer et al., 2007). Consistent with this work, people with low self-esteem had more negative self-views after having self-regulated. People with high self-esteem, however, exhibited increased positivity after having self-regulated. When energy is reduced, such as after having self-regulated (Gailliot et al., 2007), biases can emerge such that activities requiring energy seem more effortful (Proffitt, 2006). Prior work examined mostly positive illusions regarding the capacity of the self (e.g., subjective control, perceptions of one’s abilities), and likewise linked the energy-depleted state to perceptions of a weaker self. The current work differs because it examined perceptions of self-positivity. Past work on the aftereffects of self-regulation has found that individual differences moderate the effects of self-regulation upon later self-regulation, when those differences are related to the domain of self-regulation (Baumeister et al., 2006). Specifically, past work has shown moderation by eating restraint for eating consumption (Kahan, Polivy, & Herman, 2003; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), the motivation to respond without prejudice for stereotype suppression (Gailliot, Plant, Butz, & Baumeister, 2007), the temptation to drink alcohol for alcohol consumption (Muraven, Collins, & Nienhaus, 2002), sex drive for sexual restraint (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007), and attachment style for interpersonal functioning (Vohs, et al., 2005). The current work indicates that self-esteem moderates self views following self-regulation. The aftereffects of self-regulation appear attributable to decreases in blood glucose levels (Fairclough & Houston, 2004; Gailliot et al., 2007). This suggests that biases related to self-esteem might emerge more strongly after people have self-regulated because glucose is lower. It is therefore possible that low glucose might increase biases related to self-esteem. When glucose is low, people lack the metabolic energy needed to maintain moderate, socially appropriate self-views. Many studies have linked low glucose or problems with glucose to an increased likelihood of depression (for a review, see Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). There are strong links between depression and low self-esteem (APA, 1994). It is possible that people with depression view themselves negatively because of low glucose or problems with glucose, consistent with the current finding that self-regulating increases negative self-views among people with low self-esteem. This effect could worsen or prolong depressive symptoms. The amount of metabolic energy that can be used during any given amount of time is limited (Kleiber 1961). Energy used by one process (e.g., reproduction) therefore can divert energy away from and impair other processes (e.g., self-control) (Aiello, 1997; Aiello & Wheeler, 1995; Aiello, Bates, & Joffe, 2001; Gailliot, Hildebrandt, Eckel, & Baumeister, 2009). If the current effects are indeed linked to low glucose, then metabolic demands that deplete glucose (e.g., the growth of cancer cells, immune defense, excessive physical exercise) could increase biases related to self-esteem. Maintaining moderate views requires glucose for self-regulation that cannot be diverted to other processes without impairment.

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Current Directions in Psychological Research, 15, 131-135. Rosenberg, M. ( 1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending and a general theory. Psychological Review, 84, 127-190. Vohs, K.D. (January 2004). The health of romantic relationships relies on selfregulation. Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Austin, TX. Vohs, K.D., Baumeister, R.F., & Ciarocco, N.J. (2005). Self-regulation and self-presentation: Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful self-presentation depletes regulatory resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 632-657. Vohs, K.D., & Heatherton, T.F. (2000). Self-regulatory failure: A resource-depletion approach. Psychological Science, 11, 249-254.

Ms. Ref. No.: JESP-D-09-00501 Title: Self-Regulation to Maintain Moderate Self Views: Prior Self-Regulation Increases Biases Related to Self-Esteem Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Dear Matthew,

Thanks for sending us your paper on self-regulation and self esteem. Unfortunately, I must report that I will not be able to accept your manuscript for publication in JESP. Two expert reviewers have commented on your paper and although they found some aspects of your work to be fascinating, neither thought the paper crossed the bar for publication in JESP. I also read the paper independently and my reading was similar to the reviewers.

The reviewers have outlined their reactions to the paper very clearly in their comments that are attached to this letter. Let me just summarize a few of the points that the reviewers made. The first is that the basis for the hypothesis is not completely transparent.

Reviewer 1 remarks on this and Reviewer 2 fills in the details about why the hypotheses may be problematic. More important, both reviewers are concerned about your data presentation. The reviewers point out that you had two participants interact with each other, so the data obtained from each member of the pair is dependent on the other member of the pair. This requires a different level of analysis than treating all of your data as individual, independent data points. It is also difficult to know where the 'action' is in the correlations you presented because, as the reviewers mention, the means were not presented. My guess is that the some of the difficulties the reviewers highlighted may be fixable, but the problem of the independence of the data points is not.

Reviewer 2 is especially encouraging in urging you to continue your work on this issue, but both reviewers and I agree that the current experiment contains too many problematic issues to be published in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.

As always, I appreciate your sending us your work to review at JESP. I regret that I could not have brought you better news about this particular paper.

Yours sincerely,

Joel Cooper Editor Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

P.S. Reviewer 2 used an attached file for his/her review. This is supposed to be available to you as a download. I have found that sometimes the EES electronic system does not provide the download. If it does not, please let me know and I will copy-and-paste it as a Word document for you.

Reviewers' comments:


Reviewer #1: I have the following concerns about this research and the manuscript:

First, it was not clear to me why depleted self-regulation resources should moderate the effect of self-esteem on self-positivity. That is, the rational for the main hypothesis could be improved.

Because the authors did not provide the mean and the distribution of the positivity bias, it is unknown whether low self-esteem was in fact related to underestimating the extent to which the self was rated positively. If almost all of the participants exhibit a positive positivity-bias (which I assume), then most people with low self-esteem also overestimate the extent to which one was viewed positively (but to a lesser degree compared with people with high self-esteem), which is not what the authors have hypothesized.

I was also concerned about the small sample size. There were only 32 participants so I wonder how replicable those findings are.

Finally, it seems to me that the unit of analysis was the individual rather than the group. However, because the participants may have influenced each other, the pair is the more appropriate unit of analysis (which further reduces statistical power).



Action and Passivity as Proportional to Available Self-Control (Metabolic) Energy: Self-Control Use, Diabetes, and Action

Matthew T. Gailliot University of Albany

Abstract The capacity for action may be directly proportional to the amount of its available energy. After having used self-control, participants showed reduced action, or increased passivity, in the form of reduced activity during a social interaction (Studies 1 and 2) and less talking during a group discussion (Study 3). This effect occurred only among people who typically are highly active in such situations – those with low anxieties and high extraversion. A final study suggested that the effect may be mediated by metabolism, showing that people with diabetes tend to watch more television than do people without. Action might rely on the same energy as self-control and on that which is disrupted during diabetes, indicating metabolic energy as underlying a broad capacity for action.

The capacity for work is directly proportional to the amount of energy available to perform that work. Action – a form of work – thus should be directly determined by energy levels. The current work tested this hypothesis by examining whether having used self-control would decrease action and whether this effect might concern metabolism. Self-control is impaired after its use (Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Gailliot, 2009a; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), likely because self-control can reduce glucose in the bloodstream – yet is impaired by low glucose (DeWall, Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; DeWall, Gailliot, Deckman, & Bushman, 2009; Fairclough & Houston, 2004; Gailliot, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e; Gailliot et al., 2007; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007a; Gailliot, Hildebrandt, Eckel, & Baumeister, 2009; Gailliot, Peruche, Plant, & Baumeister, 2009; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). One hypothesis was that having used self-control would decrease action, or increase passivity, plausibly by depleting glucose. This would indicate that action is proportional to available energy – action decreases when the energy underlying self-control has been depleted. Glucose is a primary energy for the brain. People with diabetes demonstrate problems with glucose – they often experience hypoglycemic or hyperglycemic glucose levels and glucose intolerance. A connection between diabetes and action therefore suggests metabolism as a potential mediator of the link between self-control and passivity. Action is proportional to energy – action is reduced among people with a metabolic disorder that disrupts energy use. The rationale for a connection between action and available metabolic energy is supported by work showing that having used self-control increases passive choice and behavior (e.g., doing less to prepare for a task) (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Vohs & Baumeister, 2009), and by work linking self-control to vitality – a tendency to be energetic and active (Muraven, Gagne, & Rosman, 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2008). Other supporting evidence is that hunger increases passivity (Alaimo, Olson, Edward, & Frongillo, 2001; Barrett, Radke-Yarrow, & Klein, 1982; Casey, Szeto, Lensing, Bogle, & Weber, 2001; Chavez, & Martinez, 1979; Gailliot, 2009f ; Graves, 1976, 1978; Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, 1996; Pollitt, Golub, & Gorman, 1996; Sigman et al., 2005; Strupp & Levitsky, 1995; Wyon, Abrahamsson, Jartelius, & Fletcher, 1997), as does low glycogen in the brain (Gailliot, 2008). Energy availability can be reduced during hunger or when glycogen is low, and action likewise is reduced. Studies 1 through 3 examined whether having used self-control would reduce activity in a social interaction (interacting with another person or participating in a group discussion) among people likely to be most active (i.e., among those with little anxiety and among those scoring high in extraversion). Study 4 examined whether activity would be reduced among people with (v without) diabetes, such that they watch more television. Action, or passivity, is posited to be determined by the same energy available for self-control or by metabolic energy. Study 1 Using (v not using) self-control – by controlling attention while watching a video – was predicted to decrease subsequent action in the form of being less active while teaching a person how to putt. To the extent that the effect is due to increased passivity, then it might decrease activity primarily among people who typically would engage in high activity during the interaction – in this case, people with low trait anxiety. Method Only men participated. Participants completed the State-Trait Anxiety Index (STAI) during a mass testing session (Spielberger, Reheiser, Ritterband, Sydeman, & Unger, 1995). Participants returned to the laboratory for a separate experimental session, held at least 1 month later. Participants first watched a 6-minute video (without sound) of a woman talking with words appearing in the corner of the screen. Participants randomly assigned to the attention control condition were asked to use self-control by avoiding looking at the words instead to focus on the woman’s face. Participants randomly assigned to the watch normally condition were asked to watch the video as they would normally. After the video, participants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS) as a measure of mood valence and arousal (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). Participants then had a 4-minute social interaction with a female confederate, who posed as a student while the participant was instructed to teach her how to putt. After the interaction, the confederate rated how each participant had acted on various dimensions, including 3 items (i.e., talkative, active, shy) indicative of activity level (α = .87). The confederate was blind to hypotheses. Results and Discussion A regression analysis that predicted activity scores from video condition, anxiety scores, and their interaction indicated a significant interaction, β = 1.94, t = 2.42, p < .05 (see Figure 1) that remained even when controlling for mood valence and arousal, β = 1.97, t = 1.88, p < .05 (one-tailed). Tests of simple effects indicated that, among participants scoring low in anxiety (i.e., 1 SD below the mean), those in the attention control condition were rated as less active than were those in the watch normally condition, β = -2.41, t = -2.39, p < .05. Thus, having used self-control reduced activity among people with low anxiety. Among participants scoring high in anxiety (i.e., 1 SD above the mean), the two conditions did not differ in activity level, p = .21. Having used self-control therefore decreased activity, or increased passivity, only among people who typically are socially active. Study 2 People low in anxiety seem prone to exhibit higher activity levels during social interactions, then so should people who seldom experience social anxiety during interactions. They therefore may exhibit passivity following self-control use. Study 2 tested this hypothesis. Method Participants completed the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) during a mass testing session (Spielberger, Reheiser, Ritterband, Sydeman, & Unger, 1995). Participants came to the laboratory for a separate session, held at least 1 month later. Participants first completed a task for 4 minutes. Participants randomly assigned to the Stroop condition completed a task in which they viewed color words (red, blue, or green) on a list that appeared in an incongruent font color (red, blue, or green). Participants were asked to state aloud the font color, which required self-control to override the prepotent tendency to automatically read the words. Participants randomly assigned to the read aloud condition completed a similar task except the words appeared in black font. After the task, participants completed the BMIS as a measure of mood valence and arousal (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) and a measure of self-efficacy (i.e., “How well do you think you did on the Stroop task?”). Participants then had a 3 minute conversation with the experimenter, during which they were asked to try to get to know one another. After the interaction, the experimenter rated how each participant had acted on various dimensions, including 4 items (i.e., talkative, active, active during the conversation, shy) indicative of activity level (α = .91). The experimenter was blind to hypotheses. Results and Discussion A regression analysis that predicted activity scores from task condition, social anxiety scores, and their interaction indicated a significant interaction, β = .97, t = 2.23, p < .05 (see Figure 2), that remained even when controlling for mood valence, arousal, and self-efficacy, β = .68, t = 1.75, p < .05 (one-tailed). Tests of simple effects indicated that, among participants scoring low in social anxiety, those in the Stroop condition were rated as less active than were those in the read aloud condition, β = -1.43, t = -2.32, p < .05. Thus, having used self-control reduced activity among people low in social anxiety. Among participants scoring high in social anxiety, the two conditions did not differ in activity level, p = .41. Having used self-control therefore decreased activity, or increased passivity, only among people who typically are socially active, consistent with the results of Study 1. Study 3 Extraverts are more talkative than introverts. They therefore may be more likely to talk less (show less action) during a group discussion after having used self-control, to the extent that action relies on a broadly used, interchangeable energy that is used for self-control. Method Participants first completed a 10-item measure of the Big 5 personality traits, including 2 items (i.e., reserved, quiet and extraverted, enthusiastic) intended to assess extraversion (α = .71; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). Participants next completed either the Stroop or reading aloud task used in Study 2. Afterward, participants completed the BMIS as a measure of mood valence and arousal (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). Participants then participated in a videotaped group discussion on parking for 8 minutes and were invited to comment on different questions (e.g., Have you had any good or bad experiences? Do you know of any ways to improve parking?). After the discussion, participants indicated the extent to which they had been motivated to talk and to share their opinions (α = .93) and to which they thought it was important or mattered that they talk (α = .88). The dependent measure of activity was the amount of time each participant spent talking. Results and Discussion A regression analysis that predicted amount of time spent talking from task condition, extraversion scores, and their interaction indicated a significant interaction, β = -1.17, t = -2.17, p < .05 (see Figure 3), that remained even when controlling for mood valence, arousal, motivation to talk, and perceived importance of talking, β = -.79, t = -1.72, p < .05 (one-tailed). Tests of simple effects indicated that, among participants scoring high in extraversion, those in the Stroop condition talked for less time than did those in the read aloud condition, β = -3.21, t = -2.07, p < .05. Thus, having used self-control reduced activity among people high in extraversion. Among participants scoring low in extraversion, those in the two conditions did not differ from one another in amount of time spent talking, p = .33. Having used self-control therefore decreased activity, or increased passivity, only among people who typically talk often during social situations, consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2. Study 4 Another form of passivity is watching television. The hypothesis was that people with diabetes would exhibit decreased action in the form of watching more television, therefore suggesting metabolic energy as underlying the link between self-control and action. Method Data were from the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III) 1988–1994 from the National Center for Health Statistics. It included 9,113 participants (though not all participants completed all measures). Relevant to the current study, participants reported whether (yes or no) a doctor had told them they have diabetes and the number of hours they had watched television or videos during the past 30 days, as well as their age, education level, and household and family income levels. Participants also had their body mass index (BMI) assessed. Results and Discussion Participants who reported having been told they have diabetes (M = 3.07, SD = 1.67) indicated had watched television or videos more frequently than did participants who reported they had not been told they have diabetes (M = 3.07, SD = 1.67), F (1, 9111) = 34.78, p < .001. This difference remained when controlling for age, education level, household and family income, and BMI scores, F (1, 7077) = 14.44, p < .001. Having a metabolic disorder therefore predicted less activity in the form of increased passive, television watching. General Discussion The current work suggests that metabolic energy – a common, widely used energy source – may underlie the capacity for action. After having used self-control, participants showed reduced action, or increased passivity, in the form of reduced activity during a social interaction (Studies 1 and 2) and less talking during a group discussion (Study 3). This effect occurred only among people who typically are highly active in such situations – those with low anxieties and high extraversion. A final study suggested that the effect may be mediated by metabolic energy (e.g, glucose), showing that people with diabetes – those with problems with metabolic energy – tend to watch more television than do people without. These findings are consistent with work on perceptual biases that emerge after having used self-control – people perceive themselves as having less subjective control and of having worsened abilities (Fischer, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2007). These biases may emerge partly because people have less energy for action. Having used self-control has been found to increase some forms of action (i.e., those consistent with having weakened self-control), including sexual, aggressive, and eating behaviors (DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007b; Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronski, 2006; Kahan, Polivy, & Herman, 2003; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). It is possible that in the presence of factors activating desires typically restrained by self-control, having used self-control may either increase or change action. The current studies, in contrast, offered no food, no sexual opportunities, no calls to aggression. Metabolic energy is limited and is shared and diverted among processes (Gailliot et al., 2009). Increases in metabolic demands (e.g., reproductive costs, increased immune activity) might therefore decrease action, or increase passivity. Indeed, increased metabolic activity in the ovaries has been linked to increased passivity among women. Reduced energy’s decreasing action may be attributable to conservation. When less energy is available, such as after having used self-control or among people with diabetes, increased conservation mechanisms may sway thought and decision away from action – which uses more energy than does passivity. Indeed, diabetes demonstrates a pattern in which the brain receives inadequate energy and so energy is diverted from fat, muscle, and other cells (Gailliot et al., 2009), thereby suggesting conservation that may bias one toward passivity. Action, or resisting passivity, requires developing inertia toward the active state, overriding conflicting motivations to conserve energy or be passive, and increasing energy use for mental and mechanical activity. Action therefore should be influenced by energy available, being reduced in step with reduced energy.

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Ms. Ref. No.: JESP-D-09-00492 Title: Action and Passivity as Proportional to Available Self-Control (Metabolic) Energy: Self-Control Use, Diabetes, and Action Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Dear Dr. Gailliot:

I have now received two reviews of the manuscript that you recently submitted to JESP as a Flashreport ("Action and Passivity as Proportional to Available Self-Control (Metabolic) Energy: Self-Control Use, Diabetes, and Action"). The reviewers have a good deal of expertise in the area of self-control (both its causes and its effects).

When editing a paper, I always read the paper thoroughly prior to reading any of the reviews. I make detailed notes. I then read the reviews, and I try to integrate everything into a coherent decision. I saw many things to like about the paper - it is a timely issue; the results of the first three studies are very consistent; 4 studies in a Flashreport is noteworthy - that's a record for Flashreports that I have seen; and it is certainly important to identify the processes responsible for the decreased activity effects of exerting self-control. However, my reading also led me to note two major problems with the paper. First, Study 4 seemed to add very little to the paper. Just because two different conditions lead to the same effect doesn't mean in any way that the same causes or processes are involved. I can get you to bend over by dropping a $20 bill on the ground or by threatening you with a gun or by kicking you in the stomach. We will observe the same behavior but for different reasons, and each reason will have very different physiological effects. Both reviewers note this as well. Of course, this problem could be eliminated by simply cutting Study 4. But then we would have no insight into the process that underlies your effect, and this is what the major contribution would have been. As Reviewer 2 points out, Studies 1-3 don't add a significant contribution beyond what prior published research has shown.

My second problem involved the major hypothesis of the first three studies. You predict (and find) that the increased passivity effect would occur only for people who are typically highly active in the situations that you used. Although this would not be an earth-shaking finding, it would add a bit to existing literature. However, I didn't understand the reasoning behind the hypothesis. People who are less active still do engage in the target behaviors and have lots of room for decreases. Why shouldn't decreased metabolic activity (if that is really the cause) also decrease their level of activity? One might argue that people high in activity levels are greatly motivated to engage in the behaviors, even when metabolically challenged. For example, being tired is more likely to decrease the running of non-committed (low activity) runners but not highly committed, active runners. So, I don't think that the rationale for the hypothesis is clear and tight.

In the case of Flashreports, we try hard to make a quick and simple up or down decision rather than go through the "revise and resubmit" route. Based on the concerns that have been pointed out by the reviewers and that I have also identified, I'm afraid that I have decided to decline the opportunity to accept your manuscript for publication. Thank you for thinking of JESP as a potential outlet for your work, and I hope that the comments of the reviewers will help you move this line of research forward. If and when you can identify the processes involved in these effects, the contribution will be significant.

Yours sincerely,

Jim Sherman Associate Editor Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer #1: I think this research would be of interest to a broad number of people, if framed in the right way. Unfortunately, as currently written it is like not to have the impact the author (or editor) would like. Briefly, there are several significant problems that should be address. First, the Introduction is framed as being about glucose, but 75% of the studies do not investigate glucose levels at all. I think it would be a much stronger manuscript if the author focused on the major point of the experiments-active vs. passive. Frankly, I found the research itself hard to evaluate. I realize that the Flash Report format come with very tight word limits, but basic information, like the number of participants was not reported. The last study was entirely unconvincing-people with diabetes may feel sicker and therefore are less likely to seek more active forms of entertainment. Or perhaps they have diabetes because they did not get exercise, instead choosing to watch TV.

Reviewer #2: Review JESP-D-09-00492

I found the research presented interesting and I was impressed by the three interactions fitting perfectly the author's predictions. On the more skeptical side I have the following comments:

1. I'm not sure about how we learn from Studies 1-3 beyond what is known from Study 4 in Baumeister et al. (1998). If I interpret the results correctly, the new messages are that (a) depending on the DV depletion may lead to passivity only in individuals with certain characteristics (as compared to the main effect reported in Baumeister et al.), and (b) there now is evidence for the robustness of the effect, which was shown in only one published study before. To be sure, I definitely think more replications or replication-like studies should be published and I thought these were fine studies. I'm just not sure if JESP is the right outlet for this.

2. I felt that Study 4 did not have a good fit with the first three studies. The pattern of results is in line with the author's reasoning, but there are plenty of alternative explanations. Also, the suggested meditational pattern has not actually been shown and the reasoning that changes in glucose are responsible for the effects in Studies 1-3 is not followed through with experimental work. Study 4 struck me more as a Study 1 in a different paper on mediational mechanisms. I suggest omitting this study and providing more information on the remaining three instead (see below).

3. On a more general note, I would like to see more discussion of the question what actually is reduced in ego depletion. Is it really just glucose and, thus, a resource? The introduction suggests that the author argues just that. However, I have no doubts that most participants would have had no difficulty to show more activity if asked to do so in Studies 1-3. Hence, a motivational component may be tapped as well by ego depletion and a couple of published studies corroborate this view. So it may not just be the capacity for action that is depleted and not just the capacity for action may be responsible for activity versus passivity. I think the ms would benefit if capacity/resources and motivation would be delineated from each other and the findings discussed in light of this distinction.

4. A lot of information is missing in the methods and results sections, including very basic information such as the number of participants per study and results from the multiple regression analyses. I suggest adding this information

Having Used Self-Control Reduces Emotion Regulation – Emotion Regulation as Relying on Interchangeably Used ‘Self-Control Energy’

Matthew T. Gailliot University of Albany

Anne Zell Augustana College

Roy F. Baumeister Florida State University

Abstract Four studies tested and confirmed the hypothesis that having used self-control reduces subsequent emotion regulation. Participants first completed a task that either did or did not require self-control (attention control, overriding one’s accustomed writing style, or breaking a habit). They later encountered situations designed to activate emotions that typically are downregulated. Participants either met someone new (anxiety), anticipated speaking publicly (anxiety), or recalled times when they felt sad or romantically jealous. Compared to participants who had not completed a self-control task, those who had used self-control reported feeling the target emotion to a greater extent. The results from a final study supported the idea that having used self-control reduces emotion regulation rather than increasing the strength of emotion generally.

The desire to feel positive emotionally might rank among people’s most important and pervasive goals. To escape negative moods and maintain positive moods, people frequently regulate their emotions (Isen, 1984). The ability to regulate emotions has been shown to be important across the lifespan and across numerous domains, from interpersonal relationships (Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000) to work (Judge & Larsen, 2001). Successful emotion regulation has been shown to predict several crucial life outcomes, including better mental and physical health (Gross, 1998) and enhanced subjective well being (Larsen & Prizmic, 2004). The current work examines the role of self-control in emotion regulation. The theory is that emotion regulation requires self-control resources. People are more prone to fail at regulating their emotions when self-control resources are low or have been depleted. Thus, prior acts that consume self-control resources should reduce subsequent emotion regulation. Self-Control as a Limited Resource Self-control, or the ability to override thoughts, emotions, impulses, and behavioral tendencies, appears to rely on a limited resource or energy (Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Engaging in an act of self-control depletes this energy source and consequently impairs later attempts at self-control (Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson, Shelton, & Trawalter, 2005). For instance, participants in one study who had resisted eating freshly baked cookies quit sooner on a subsequent task requiring effortful persistence, compared to participants who had not resisted the cookies (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Resisting the cookies presumably depleted participants’ self-control energy that was needed for the subsequent task. Findings from several other studies support the notion that self-control relies on a limited energy source. An initial self-control task has been shown to impair dietary restraint (Kahan, Polivy, & Herman, 2003; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), stereotype suppression (Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2004), drinking restraint (Muraven, Collins, & Neinhaus, 2002), money management (Faber & Vohs, 2004), accommodating behaviors in close relationships (Finkel & Campbell, 2001), impression management (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005), and aggressive restraint (DeWall, Stillman, Baumeister, & Gailliot, 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006). People also seem more prone to fail at self-control after previous self-control exertion in their day to day lives (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). One study, for instance, found that high self-control demands throughout the day predicted poor drinking restraint later in the evening (Muraven, Collins, Shiffman, & Paty, 2005). Thus, self-control seems to rely on a limited energy source that can become depleted with use. The current work examined whether depleted self-control would reduce emotion regulation. Self-Control and Emotion Regulation Emotion regulation may rely on self-control energy. Indirect evidence for this idea comes from studies linking good emotion regulation to good self-control. Children and adults with better self-control have been found to cope more easily with aversive emotions and hence to more frequently experience positive mood states (e.g., Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006; Eisenberg, Smith, Sadovsky, & Sprinrad, 2004; Fabes et al., 1999; Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000). High self-control predicts greater emotional stability and a reduced incidence of depression, anxiety, anger, and personal distress (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Moreover, self-control abilities during childhood have been shown to predict emotional coping years later during adolescence (Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990). Other work provides evidence that more directly indicates emotion regulation as relying on self-control energy. After regulating their emotions, people seem more prone to fail at acts of self-control, including dieting, quitting smoking, delaying gratification, and refraining from drug and alcohol use (for a review, see Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Amplifying or suppressing positive or negative emotions has been found to undermine impression management (Vohs et al., 2005), accommodating behaviors (Finkel & Campbell, 2001), health related behaviors (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003), effortful persistence (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998), and intellectual abilities relying on controlled processing (Baumeister et al., 1998; Schmeichel, Demaree, Robinson, & Pu, 2006; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003; Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Emotion regulation thus seems to require self-control energy, insofar as it reduces later self-control. Why might emotion regulation require self-control? Direct control of emotion is difficult or impossible, and so effortful substitute strategies are needed (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993). Though there are many ways to regulate emotions, people frequently regulate their emotions using effortful cognitive strategies such as suppressing or distracting themselves from unwanted feelings and instead focusing on more pleasant thoughts or feelings (see Larsen & Prizmic, 2004; Tamres et al., 2002; Tennen & Affleck, 2002). Effortful cognition can require self-control (Schmeichel et al., 2003), and so the assumption was that emotion regulation would too. The current work sought to provide a fuller understanding of the link between self-control and emotion regulation by examining whether self-control depletion reduces emotion regulation. To the extent that emotion regulation relies on the same energy source as self-control, then initial acts that require self-control, and therefore deplete self-control energy, should reduce later emotion regulation. Overview and Hypotheses of the Current Work Four studies were conducted to test the hypothesis that self-control depletion reduces emotion regulation. In each study, participants first completed a task that either did or did not require self-control. To provide converging evidence, each study included a different self-control task, namely controlling one’s attention (Studies 1 and 2), overriding one’s accustomed writing style (Study 3), or breaking a habit (Study 4). After the initial task, participants underwent a procedure designed to elicit emotion likely to be downregulated. These procedures involved interacting with a stranger (Study 1) or anticipating speaking in front of a large group (Study 2), so as to elicit anxiety, or thinking about an event that had made one previously feel jealous (Study 3) or sad (Study 4). The prediction was that participants who had used self-control would report experiencing stronger emotions, compared to participants who had not used self-control. Additionally, Study 4 tested an alternative theory – self-control depletion may increase the strength of emotions because emotions themselves increase in strength or because people feel their emotions more intensely, rather than emotion regulation being reduced. Study 1: Social Anxiety Study 1 examined whether self-control depletion would increase anxiety while meeting someone new. Most people value being accepted and liked by others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). People are strongly motivated to make a good impression on others, and concerns over acceptance, self-presentation, and other factors during social interactions can produce anxiety (Leary, 1995; Leary & Kowalski, 1995). To the extent that coping with social anxiety requires self-control, then people should experience greater social anxiety when their self-control has been depleted. Participants first watched a video of a woman talking while words appeared on the screen. Participants in the depletion condition were instructed to focus only on the woman and to ignore the words. Because attention automatically focuses on novel stimuli appearing in the environment (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), the task required self-control in that it required the inhibition of pre-potent orienting of attention to the words to maintain attention only on the woman. Participants in the no depletion condition watched the video as they would normally and hence were required to exert little or no self-control. After the video task, participants engaged in a brief conversation with another participant whom they had never met. We expected that interacting with an unfamiliar person would increase anxiety. To assess anxiety, participants later indicated how anxious they had been during the interaction, how anxious their partner had been, and the extent to which their partner had perceived them as having been anxious. We predicted that depletion would reduce the self-regulation of anxiety during the interaction, and thus depleted participants would score higher on the various measures of anxiety than would non-depleted participants. Method Participants and procedure. Seventy-two undergraduates (50 women) participated in exchange for course credit. Participants attended in same-sex dyads and were told that the study was investigating factors related to social interactions, attitudes, and task performance. First, participants completed the video task alone in individual rooms. Participants watched a 6 minute video (without sound) of a woman talking (modified from Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988). In the bottom corner of the screen, common one-syllable words (e.g., hair, hat, pulse) appeared one at a time for 10 seconds. Dyads randomly assigned to the depletion condition were instructed to focus their attention only on the woman’s face and to refrain from looking at the words. If they happened to look at the words, they were to re-focus their attention on the woman as quickly as possible. Dyads randomly assigned to the no depletion condition were instructed to watch the video as they would normally. At the end of the task, participants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) as a measure of mood valence and arousal. Next, the experimenter told participants that they (the two participants) would be having an interaction in which they should try to get to know each other. During the interaction, participants discussed their responses to 5 questions (e.g., “What are you majoring in, or what do you think you will major in? Why?”, “What is one of your happiest childhood memories?”, “If you could change one thing about yourself, what would that be?”). Participants were given as much time as they needed to discuss each of the questions. The interactions were timed and videotaped. Last, participants returned to their individual rooms and rated how anxious they had been during the interaction, how anxious their partner had been, and the extent to which their partner had perceived them as having been anxious, using scales from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). These items were embedded among other filler items (e.g., ratings of friendliness). Responses to these 3 items served as the dependent measures of social anxiety. As a measure of self-efficacy, participants also indicated on a subsequent item the extent to which they believed that they had performed well on the video task, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). Participants then were thanked and debriefed. Results Social anxiety. Gender was marginally related to ratings of anxiety and so was included in the analyses. A 2 (depletion vs. no depletion) X 2 (gender) MANOVA on ratings of self-anxiety, partner-anxiety, and perceptions of partners’ perceptions of anxiety indicated a significant main effect of depletion condition, F(3, 66) = 3.00, p < .05. Depleted participants scored higher than did non-depleted participants on all 3 measures of anxiety, Fs > 5.80, ps < .05 (see Figure 1). Depleted participants rated themselves as having been more anxious and as having been perceived by their partner as being more anxious. They also rated their partners as having been more anxious. Hence, multiple measures of anxiety converged in showing that depletion increased anxiety. This is consistent with the idea that depletion reduces emotion regulation. The main effect of gender approached significance, F(3, 66) = 2.17, p = .10, such that male participants scored somewhat higher than women across the 3 anxiety measures. The interaction between depletion condition and gender was non-significant, F = 1.10, ns. Thus, depletion seemed to increase anxiety equally among both men and women. Mood, arousal, self-efficacy, and length of interaction. The tests of between-subjects effects from the MANOVA reported above on the 3 measures of anxiety remained significant when controlling for mood, self-efficacy, and the duration of the interaction, Fs > 4.72, ps < .05. The obtained pattern of results thus does not seem to be due to mood valence or arousal immediately after the video task, feelings of self-efficacy on the video task, or the duration of the interaction. Study 2: Public Speaking Anxiety Study 1 showed that depletion increased anxiety during an interpersonal interaction. Study 2 examined whether depletion would increase anxious concerns regarding speaking in front of a large group. Public speaking is a prominent fear among many. It therefore seems plausible that people seek to cope with anxious concerns prior to speaking in public, and that depleted self-control might reduce such coping. Participants first completed the video task used in Study 1. They were then led to believe that they would perform an impromptu speech in front of the other participants and reported how anxious they were immediately before their apparent speech. The prediction was that depletion would reduce the downregulation of concerns over public speaking, and therefore that depleted participants would indicate being more anxious than would non-depleted participants. Method Participants. Sixty-four undergraduates (41 women) participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to a self-control depletion or no depletion condition. Procedure. Participants attended in groups of approximately 30. They were told that the study was investigating how people view themselves and others while making speeches and that a few individuals would be chosen to make a speech in front of everyone toward the end of the experiment. First, participants completed the video task used in Study 1. Those in the depletion condition were instructed to avoid looking at the words in the video and instead to focus on the woman, whereas those in the no depletion were instructed to watch as they would normally. At the end of the video, participants completed checks of the depletion manipulation by indicating the extent to which they had looked at the words and woman during the video, using scales from 1 (not at all/never) to 9 (a lot/often). They also completed the UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist (Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990), which contains 24 items (e.g., sluggish, energetic) indicative of three types of current mood valence and arousal, namely tense arousal, energetic arousal, and hedonic tone. Afterward, participants evaluated the woman in the video on her speaking abilities, intelligence, admirability, and likeability, and completed other filler items ostensibly related to public speaking. These items were included so as to bolster the cover story about making a speech and activate concerns about public speaking. Next, the experimenter told participants that everyone should prepare to make a speech about how psychology applies to their lives. The experimenter said that 4 participants would be chosen at random to make speeches while the other participants evaluated the speechmakers on the same dimensions on which they had evaluated the woman in the video. All participants were instructed to prepare for the speech in case they were among those chosen to speak in front of the group. Then, after ostensibly looking up participant numbers on the computer, the experimenter announced 4 participants who were to speak in front of the group. Participants could identify whether they were chosen based on a participant number written on their questionnaire packet. Unbeknownst to participants, however, all participants had 1 of the 4 numbers written on their packet. Hence, all participants were led to believe that they had been chosen to make a speech. Participants were then given 2 minutes for the “speechmakers” to prepare for their speech. Participants then received a questionnaire that assessed their current anxiety level, which included 7 items pertaining to anxiety (i.e., anxious, nervous, jittery, uneasy, worried, bothered, and calm) embedded among other filler items (e.g., drowsy, caring). In keeping with the cover story, participants were told that these items might be related to perceptions of the speechmakers. Participants rated the extent to which the items described their current emotional state, using a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The 7 anxiety items were combined to form the dependent measure of anxiety ( = .93). Afterward, participants completed the 33-item Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), which allowed us to assess whether any differences in self-reported anxiety might be due to desirable responding rather than actual anxiety. Last, participants were told that no one would actually be making a speech and were probed for suspicion, thanked, and debriefed. Eight participants indicated some suspicion as to whether they would actually be making a speech. Excluding these participants from analysis did not influence the results in any meaningful way, and so their data were retained. Results and Discussion Manipulation checks. The manipulation check suggested that participants were successful in following the video task instructions. Participants in the depletion condition indicated having looked at the words in the video (M = 3.21, SD = 1.76) less often and the woman (M = 6.03, SD = 1.21) more often than did participants in the no depletion condition indicate having looked at the words (M = 5.16, SD = 1.71) and woman (M = 4.67, SD = 1.56), respectively, ts > 3.89, ps < .001. Anxiety. Social desirability scores (as assessed by the Marlowe-Crowne) predicted self-reported anxiety at the end of the study, r(64) = -.27, p < .05, and self-reported anxiety differed somewhat by gender. Gender therefore was included in the analyses, and social desirability was controlled for. A 2 (depletion vs. no depletion) X 2 (gender) ANCOVA, that controlled for social desirability scores, indicated a significant main effect of depletion condition, F(1, 59) = 4.36, p < .05. Depleted participants (M = 3.36, SD = 1.02) reported higher levels of anxiety than did non-depleted participants (M = 2.81, SD = 1.06). This is consistent with the notion that depleted self-control reduces coping with aversive emotions. The main effect of gender approached significance, F(1, 59) = 2.03, p = .16, such that women reported somewhat higher anxiety than men. The interaction between depletion condition and gender was not significant, F = 1, ns. Mood and arousal. The obtained pattern of results seems unlikely to have been attributable to self-reported mood valence or arousal immediately after the video task. The main effect of depletion condition on anxiety in the above ANCOVA remained significant when controlling for either tense arousal, energetic arousal, or hedonic tone, Fs > 4.06, ps < .05. Study 3: Romantic Jealousy Romantic relationships can be a meaningful and important aspect of the lives of most individuals. Hence, people are sometimes prone to experience jealousy over romantic relationships, such as when a current partner devotes attention or resources to another individual or when a potential mate is attracted to someone else (e.g., Harris, 2003). Romantic jealousy can evoke powerful emotions and responses that individuals seek to regulate and stifle (e.g., Francis, 1977; Mullen & Martin, 1994; Pines & Aronson, 1983; Sabini & Silver, 2005). Study 1 examined whether depletion would increase jealous feelings. Participants first engaged in a task that either did or did not require self-control. For the self-control task, participants wrote an essay without using any words that contained the letters a or n. Most words in the English language contain the letters a or n. The task therefore required participants to override their habitual style of writing so as to find words that did not contain an a or n. For the control task, participants were asked to write an essay without using any words that contained the letters x or z. Most words do not contain x or z, and so this task did not require much effort to override any habitual manner of writing. This manipulation has been used successfully in previous research to manipulate self-control depletion (Schmeichel, Gailliot, & Baumeister, 2005). To elicit romantic jealousy with which participants would have to cope, we next asked half of the participants to write about a time when they were jealous romantically and half to write about what they did last week, as a neutral control topic. Participants later indicated the extent to which they felt jealous. The prediction was that depletion would reduce the regulation of jealousy and therefore that depleted participants who had written about romantic jealousy would be especially jealous, relative to the other groups of participants. Non-depleted participants who had written about jealousy were expected to exhibit relatively low levels of jealousy. Depletion was not expected to influence jealousy among those who had written about the control topic, because these participants would not have had to cope with any feelings of jealousy. Method Participants. Seventy-two undergraduates (40 women) participated in exchange for course credit. This sample excluded 11 participants who failed to follow instructions (see below). Participants were randomly assigned to depletion and emotion conditions. Procedure. During a mass testing session at the start of the semester, participants completed the Multidimensional Jealousy Scale (MJS; Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989). The MJS contains 24 items divided into 3 subscales that assess the tendency to experience cognitive, emotional, and behavioral facets of intrasexual jealousy. MJS scores were included so as to account for variability in the dependent measure of sexual jealousy. Approximately 3 months after the mass testing session, participants completed the main phase of the experiment in a classroom setting. Participants were told that the study was examining attitudes, behaviors, and emotions. They received a packet that contained all study materials and instructions. Participants completed the packet at their own pace. First, participants completed the manipulation of self-control strength (borrowed from Schmeichel et al., 2005). Specifically, they were asked to write an essay describing what they did yesterday. Participants in the self-control depletion condition were further instructed to avoid using any words that contained an a or n. Participants in the no depletion condition were instructed to avoid using any words that contained an x or z (e.g., to write place where the animals live instead of zoo). Participants were given one sheet of lined paper and asked to work on the task either for 5 minutes or until they had used all of the lines. Participants who failed to follow these instructions (e.g., did not write anything) were excluded from all analyses. Upon finishing their essays, participants completed a check of the self-control manipulation by indicating the extent to which they had to override or inhibit their typical way of writing in order to follow the instructions, using a scale from 1 (very little) to 9 (a lot). They also completed a single-item measure of self-efficacy by indicating how well they felt that they had been able to follow the instructions, using a scale form 1 (very poorly) to 9 (very well). After these items, participants completed the BMIS, as a measure of current mood valence and arousal. Participants then completed the manipulation of romantic jealousy. Participants in the jealousy condition were instructed to describe briefly 4 or 5 incidents in which they felt jealous or threatened in the context of a romantic relationship. They then wrote in greater detail about one of those events. Participants in the control condition described 4 or 5 activities that they had engaged in during the last week and then wrote about one of those activities in greater detail. Participants were asked to work on this task until they had used up all of the space provided (less than ½ of a page). Participants who failed to follow these instructions were excluded from all analyses. Next, participants completed a single item measuring the extent to which they felt jealous at the present moment, which was embedded among other filler items, using a scale from 1 (very slightly) to 5 (extremely). They also completed 4 items assessing the extent to which they felt preoccupied with thoughts of jealousy, unable to stop thinking jealous thoughts, overcome or overwhelmed with jealousy, and wrapped up in jealousy, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Responses to the 5 jealousy items were standardized and combined ( = .93) to form the dependent measure of jealousy. Last, participants were thanked and debriefed. In this and all subsequent studies, we were careful to make sure that no participant left feeling distressed. Results and Discussion Manipulation check. Participants’ responses to the manipulation check indicated that the two writing tasks differed in the amount of self-control they required. Depleted participants (M = 6.50, SD = .97) reported having had to override or inhibit their typical writing style to a greater extent than did non-depleted participants (M = 1.83, SD = 1.23), t(71) = 17.28, p < .001. Romantic jealousy. A 2 (depletion vs. no depletion) X 2 (jealousy vs. control essay) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on jealousy scores that controlled for dispositional cognitive, emotional, and behavioral jealousy indicated that the main effect of jealousy condition was significant, F(1, 65) = 5.53, p < .05, and that the main effect of depletion condition was not significant, F < 1, ns. Their interaction was significant, F(1, 65) = 6.75, p = .01 (see Figure 2). In the jealousy condition, depleted participants reported feeling significantly more jealous than did non-depleted participants, F(1, 65) = 4.17, p < .05. In the control condition, depleted and non-depleted participants did not differ significantly in self-reported jealousy, F(1, 65) = 2.91, p = .09, and the means were in the opposite direction, such that depleted participants indicated feeling somewhat less jealous. (It is unclear why this trend emerged.) Depletion thus increased jealousy only among participants who had written about feeling romantically jealous. This is consistent with the hypothesis that depletion reduces emotional coping. Moreover, among depleted participants, those in the jealousy condition indicated feeling more jealous than did those in the control condition, F(1, 65) = 9.96, p < .01. Among non-depleted participants, self-reported jealousy did not differ between the jealousy and control condition, F < 1, ns. Thus, writing about romantic jealousy increased jealous thoughts and feelings but only when participants’ self-control resources had been depleted. Participants whose self-control resources were intact seemingly avoided feelings of jealousy. No evidence indicated that either gender or any of the cognitive, emotional, or behavioral dispositional jealousy subscales moderated any of the observed effects. Thus, depletion seemed to reduce coping with romantic jealousy regardless of gender and dispositional tendencies to experience jealousy. Mood, arousal, and self-efficacy. The obtained pattern of results did not appear attributable to mood valence, arousal, or self-efficacy immediately following the self-control manipulation. The interaction between depletion condition and jealousy condition reported above remained significant when controlling for these measures, F(1, 63) = 7.82, p < .01. This argues against several alternative explanations, such as the possibility that depleted participants simply were highly aroused and misattributed this arousal as jealousy. Study 4: Coping With Sadness Studies 1, 2, and 3 showed that depletion increased emotions that are often downregulated. Study 4 was designed to assess whether this effect may be attributable to depletion reducing emotion regulation or increasing emotionality. If depletion increases emotionality, then it should increase emotions that are not self-regulated. Study 4 therefore included a happiness induction. The prediction was that depletion would not increase happiness but would increase sadness. People frequently cope with sad or distressing thoughts and feelings. There is some evidence that self-control facilitates coping with sadness. For instance, good self-control has been found to predict less susceptibility to negative mood states and depression (e.g., Tangney et al., 2004). It is possible that this link is attributable to self-control facilitating emotion regulation (e.g., Tomarken & Keener, 1998). To manipulate self-control, participants in the depletion condition first completed a task that established a habit or routine of crossing out es on a page of text according to a certain rule and then required them to break this habit by following a new rule. Breaking habits and overriding established routines requires self-control and therefore was posited to deplete self-control resources. Participants in the no depletion condition crossed out es on a page of text in a fashion that did not require them to override any habit and hence required little self-control. This manipulation has been used successfully in the past to manipulate self-control exertion (Baumeister et al., 1998; Faber & Vohs, 2004). Participants then wrote about one of three topics: sad events, happy events, or what they did yesterday (neutral control). After the writing task, participants reported their mood. The prediction was that depletion would increase sadness only among participants who had written about sadness. Depletion was not expected to influence levels of happiness vs. sadness among participants who had written about happy or neutral topics because happiness is not an emotion that people typically try to regulate. Hence, depleted participants who wrote about sadness were expected to exhibit the highest levels of sadness, relative to all other groups of participants. Method Participants. Ninety undergraduates (49 men) participated in exchange for course credit. This sample excluded 3 participants who failed to complete all required materials. Participants were randomly assigned to a self-control depletion and emotion essay conditions. Procedure. Participants attended in group sessions in classrooms. They were told that the study was investigating emotion. First, participants completed the 21-item Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), which served as a control for individual differences in the dependent measure of personal sadness. Next, participants completed the self-control manipulation. Participants were given two copies of a page of journal text. On the first page, participants were to cross out every occurrence of the letter e. The page contained a high number (337) of es and so participants should have established a well-practiced routine of crossing out es. For the second page, participants assigned to the no-depletion condition were asked to follow the same rule as before. Participants in the depletion condition, in contrast, were asked to follow a different rule than before by crossing out all occurrences of the letter e except for es that were followed by a vowel or es that appeared in a word with a vowel appearing two letters before the e. At the end of the study, participants completed a check of the manipulation by indicating the extent to which the es task had required that they break a habit, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (a lot). They also completed a single item measure of self-efficacy by indicating how well they had performed on the task, using a scale from 1 (very poorly) to 9 (very well). Immediately after the es task, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988), which contains 20 items (e.g., excited, upset) indicative of current mood valence. Participants then completed the emotion manipulation. Participants in the sadness condition first described briefly 4 or 5 things that made them feel very sad or depressed. They then wrote in greater detail about one of those things. Participants in the happiness condition answered parallel questions about happiness. Participants in the control condition described 4 or 5 activities that they did yesterday and then wrote in greater detail about one of those activities. Participants were given 5 minutes to complete this task. After the essay task, participants worked on a filler task (i.e., completed a questionnaire) for 5 minutes that served as a delay to provide additional time for participants to think about their feelings. Next, participants responded to 8 items (i.e., depressed, gloomy, happy, miserable, cheerful, unhappy, sad, content) that assessed the extent to which they felt sad at the present moment, using scales from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). These items were embedded among other filler items (e.g., calm). Participants also completed 8 items indicating the extent to which they felt preoccupied with, unable to stop thinking, overcome or overwhelmed with, or wrapped up in happy thoughts and in sad thoughts, using scales from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Ratings of happiness correlated highly with those of sadness, thereby justifying combining them into a single measure. Because the two sets of items used different scales, responses to the first 8 sadness items were averaged and standardized and then combined with the standardized average of the last 8 sadness items to form the dependent measure of sadness ( = .81). Last, participants were thanked and debriefed. Results Manipulation check. Depleted participants (M = 5.53, SD = 2.49) indicated that the es task had required them to break a habit to a greater extent than did non-depleted participants (M = 2.84, SD = 2.43), t(88) = 5.18, p < .001. This suggests that the es task was successful in requiring different levels of self-control (breaking a habit). Self-reported sadness. The prediction was that depleted participants in the sadness condition would exhibit the highest levels of sadness. All other groups of participants were predicted to report experiencing relatively low and equal levels of sadness. As a test of this specific prediction, a planned comparison pitted the depleted participants in the sadness condition against the other conditions. It controlled for mood valence (as assessed by the PANAS immediately after the es task) and responses to the BDI items so as to account for additional variability in self-reported sadness. The planned comparison was significant and in line with predictions, F(1, 62) = 6.60, p < .05 (see Figure 3). Participants in the depletion condition who had written about sadness reported being significantly more sad than did participants in the depletion condition who had written about what they did yesterday, F(1, 62) = 4.75, p < .05, and participants in the no-depletion condition who had written about sadness, F(1, 62) = 3.92, p < .05. Depletion did not appear to influence emotional states with which participants likely would not have coped during the experiment. In the happiness condition, depleted and non-depleted participants did not differ in reported sadness, F < 1. If depletion influenced emotions other than those that people typically try to regulate, then one would have expected that depleted participants who had written about happiness would have scored especially low in sadness (or high in happiness). But, they did not. Depression and self-efficacy. Regression analyses indicated that the observed findings were not moderated by dispositional differences in depression (BDI scores). The above analyses included mood valence (as assessed immediately after the es task) as a covariate, which indicated that the effect of depletion on sadness likely was not attributable to any direct effects of depletion on mood. Similarly, the obtained pattern of results did not appear to be due to self-efficacy, such that the above planned comparison remained significant even when controlling for perceptions of how well participants had performed on the es task, F(1, 61) = 6.83, p < .05. General Discussion

In situations designed to activate a target emotion that is typically downregulated – either anxiety, jealousy, or sadness – participants who had previously completed a self-control task reported experiencing these emotions to a greater extent, compared to participants who had not previously completed a self-control task. These findings are consistent with the idea that self-control relies on a energy that is used interchangeably across different processes, including emotion regulation. The theory is that completing a self-control task depletes this energy, thereby reducing later emotion regulation. There are at least a few plausible mechanisms through which these effects occur. Most consistent with the extant literature and the current findings is the explanation that using self-control reduces later emotion regulation, and so emotions that typically are downregulated increase in strength. This effect may occur because, after using self-control, people lack the ability to control their emotions, or they may be less motivated to do so. Other explanations concern changes in emotion, rather than their regulation. It is plausible that using self-control increases later emotion because the emotion itself becomes stronger or because people become more sensitive to their emotions. A final study suggested against this idea – having used self-control did not increase happiness following a happiness induction. It is plausible that having used self-control increases only emotions that typically are self-regulated, without the effect involving reduce emotion regulation, but there is no clear rationale to support this idea. Each study may be improved in various ways, but the variety of methods used provide reasonable convergence supporting the hypothesis. For instance, participants in some studies first either did or did not use self-control. They then wrote about an emotionally evoking topic. It is plausible that having used self-control influenced the writing task, such as the events that participants recalled. This limitation does not, however, apply to the other studies. The studies we used focused on the self-control of negative emotions, yet the same pattern may exist for the control of positive emotions. People sometimes downregulate happiness, for instance, and having used self-control may reduce its regulation as well. There are different ways through which people regulate emotion, and self-control seems more relevant to some than to others. Antecedent and response-focused emotion regulation (Gross, 1999) may require self-control in the form of attention regulation and thought control (see Larsen & Prizmic, 2004). Emotion regulation processes requiring complex thought, such as cognitive reappraisal (Tamres et al., 2002; Tennen & Affleck, 2002) and downward social comparison (Suls & Wheeler, 2000), may relate to self-control to the extent that the same energy underlies both self-control and complex thought (Schmeichel et al., 2003). In short, we suggest that initial acts of self-control may significantly impact emotion regulation. Emotion may be shaped by many other aspects of their lives, and the costs may be high – ranging from mild, unpleasant experiences to full-blown negative emotionality and accompanying behavioral consequences.

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Reviewer 1: The paper deals with the question whether self-control depletion impairs emotion regulation. This may be an important issue since emotion regulation is crucial for living a satisfying and successful life. Evidence, indicating that self-control depletion impairs emotion regulation, may help to find ways how failures in emotion regulation can be avoided (e.g., by boosting self-regulatory strength). Although I think that the reported research can make an important contribution to the existing literature, I would like to list some problems I see with paper in its present form. 1) In order to establish that emotion regulation relies on self-control strength, the authors mention evidence that dispositional self-control predicts positive mood states, and that emotion regulation depletes self-regulatory strength (p. 4-5). I wondered why the authors did not mention previous experimental studies that investigated emotion regulation as dependent variable, measured after initial tasks requiring self-control vs. no self-control. For instance, Muraven et al. (1998, study 3) showed that participants whose self-control strength has been depleted showed stronger emotional expression than participants whose self-control strength has not been depleted. It may be useful to mention such previous studies and to point out what distinguishes the present research from them. Reference: Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as limited resource: Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 774-789. 2) From my point of view, the theoretical rationale why emotion regulation might require self-control strength has two weaknesses. The authors argue that emotion regulation requires effortful cognition (distracting oneself from unwanted feelings, and focusing on more pleasant thoughts and feelings; p. 5), and that it has been shown by Schmeichel et al. (2003) that effortful cognition requires self-control. First, the term “effortful cognition” is not very precise, and can mean a lot. The authors should define what kind of cognition they exactly mean using the term effortful cognition and why. Second, the forms of effortful cognition Schmeichel et al. (2003) showed to rely on self-control strength were logical reasoning, cognitive extrapolation, and text comprehension. However, distracting oneself from unwanted feelings and focusing on more pleasant thoughts and feelings appears to me being rather attention regulation than the forms of cognition in Schmeichel et al.‟s experiments. Since attention regulation requires self-control energy (e.g., see the experimental manipulations in studies 1 and 2 of the present paper) as well as thought control (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998), a different rationale might be theoretically stronger: Emotion regulation requires attention regulation in the form of deliberately directing attention to pleasant thoughts and feelings, and away from negative thoughts and feelings; because attention regulation depends on self-control energy, emotion regulation is supposed to do so as well. References: Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Intellectual performance and ego depletion: Role of the self in logical reasoning and other information processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 33-46. 4 Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as limited resource: Regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 774-789. 3) There is a statistical problem in study 1: For applying MANOVA, one assumption is that the observations have to be independent from each other. Since participants interacted together in dyads and this interaction is assumed to affect the dependent variable (social anxiety), this assumption has been violated. 4) “form” on page 15, paragraph 3, must be changed to “from”. 5) “Tellegan” on page 20, paragraph 1, must be changed to “Tellegen”. 6) In study 4, the authors combined the ratings of happiness with the ratings of sadness because both kinds of ratings were highly correlated (p. 20). I am not sure if it makes theoretically sense to combine measures of positive affect with measures of negative affect since positive and negative affect have been conceptualized as two distinct dimensions (e.g., in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Reference: Watson, D., Clark, L., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070. 7) I suggest adding one or two words about practical implications in the discussion. 8) In Figure 2, „Jealousy Condition“ must be changed to „Depletion Condition“. However, I suggest to use black columns for “No Depletion” and grey columns for “Depletion” as in the other figures (instead of black columns for “Control” and grey columns for “Jealousy”). 5 Reviewer 2: Gailliot and colleagues present four experiments, employing various manipulations and dependent measures, which examined whether exerting self-control reduces emotion regulation. The paper deals with an interesting topic, namely how emotion regulation may depend on the availability of self-control resources. The authors investigate this idea not only for negative but also for positive emotions. Although the findings by themselves are pretty straightforward, I am not convinced that the authors‟ drained energy account is more than a metaphor. My main concern is that across all four experiments, the independence of the depletion phase and the emotion regulation phase is not evident, something that has to be the case if one wishes to argue that both rely on interchangeably used self-control energy. The two phases are always presented as part of one study, of which the purpose is made clear up front, namely on social interactions, attitudes, and task performance (Study 1), how people view themselves and others while making speeches (Study 2), on attitudes, behaviors, and emotions (Study 3), or on emotion (Study 4). In addition, in all studies, some sort of manipulation check was performed, namely, to what extent they believed they had performed well (Study 1), to what extent they looked at the words/woman (Study 2), to what extent they had to override or inhibit their typical way of writing (Study3), or to what extent they had to break a habit (Study 4). It was not always clear from the text whether this was done at the very end of the study, or before the emotion regulation phase. If the latter was the case, as was clearly stated at least for Study 2 and 3, this could draw the attention of the participant to the purpose of the depletion goal even more. Given that participants were informed about the general theme beforehand, and were somehow asked to indicate how depleting the task was, participants may have had expectations with regard to what the first „depletion‟ part would do for the second „regulation‟ part. Although the authors did control for individual differences in perceived efficacy this does not rule out that the effects may have been due to the fact that participants felt they had used up self-control resources. Thus, rather than the result of a drained energy source per se, the effects might have been due to participants‟ lay theories about the consequences of self-control for emotion processing. In support of such an explanation, Martijn and colleagues (2002) showed that depletion effects disappeared when participants were informed that the self-control task (suppressing emotions) would not undermine performance on a subsequent self-control test (squeezing a handgrip). If the effects in the current studies can really be attributed to depleted self-control resources, the effects should hold, even when the two phases of the study (the depletion part versus the regulation part) are presented as separate, unrelated experiments. This would have been more convincing evidence. It is not clear how the findings, and especially those of the fourth experiment, support the idea that self-control reduces emotion regulation, rather than that it increases emotion generation. In Study 4 in particular, the emotion-regulation phase is very similar to what many other experimenters have coined emotion induction, namely describing some event that has made you sad, happy etc. More convincing would be if the experimenters had somehow varied the appropriateness of the emotion more explicitly (for example the often used depletion manipulation of suppressing ones emotional expression in response to a funny/disgusting movie clip). The fact that participants did not report any less sadness in response to the happy events than in 6 response to neutral events may have been an indication that the happiness induction has not been successful, and that the lack of findings may have been due to the low arousal of the happy memories compared to the sad memories (bad is stronger than good). Moreover, emotion regulation is not only about the down-regulation of emotions but also about up-regulation. If people are motivated to feel good, one would expect an up-regulation in the no depletion condition. This, and the argument that people need not suppress happy feelings because these have a positive hedonic tone runs somewhat contrary to the absence of any differences between the neutral and the happy conditions. Also, it is somewhat surprising that the authors collapsed happiness and sadness and interpreted the effect of happiness as a lack of sadness. If I don‟t feel sad, I don‟t necessarily feel happy. Despite the strong overall correlation between happiness and sadness (what about the other items?), it would have been more informative to report the effects on happiness separately, i.e. to see whether the happiness induction had been successful. Some minor points: - at p.13, par.2, the authors refer to Study 1 rather than 3. - style of statistical reports varies - what was the exact purpose of the filler task in Study 4? How can participants think about their feelings if they perform a task? - it may be relevant to embed the current findings in the broader literature on the effects of sleep-deprivation/intoxication/reduced prefrontal control on emotion processing. What mechanism would reflect the self-control energy source? -how does the section in the introduction on individual differences in self-control and emotion regulation success relate to the authors‟ limited energy source account? Do people with better self-control have more energy? Are these people less easily depleted?

Undergraduates Experience Increased Affect/Emotion After Having Used Self-Control or Executive Functioning

Following the depletion of energy useable for self-control and executive functioning, people may perceive themselves as experiencing self-relevant affect and/or emotion more intensely, and perhaps other-relevant affect/emotion less intensely. Indicative of depleted psychological or metabolic energy, participants reported being in a worse mood and as being less energetically aroused after they had used self-control – the state defined as ego depletion. This state also led to perceptions of feeling less personally distressed after hearing about a victim of a recent tragedy, which mediated decreases in helping that victim. Positive pictures – such as of a smiling child – were rated as being more pleasant, and negative pictures – such as of a spider – were rated as being less pleasant, to an extent that correlated negatively with the extent to which glucose in the bloodstream decreased after ≈ 30 minutes of mental activity.

– 976 university undergraduates completed a task that either did (i.e., regulating emotion, suppressing thought, changing routine, controlling attention, overriding prepotent response) or did not (watching a video that may have aroused emotion, writing-down thoughts, following early routine, reading aloud) entail self-control. They afterward completed a measure of mood/arousal (BMIS, Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; PNAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; UWIST, Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990). These measures indicated a significant, albeit weak, effect of having used self-control increasing negative mood (BMIS), F = (1, 594) = 10.13, p < .05, d = .26, and decreasing energetic-arousal (UWIST), F (1, 620) = 8.54, p < .005, d = .23.


Testable Hypotheses

Is using self-control during ego depletion, or after having used self-control misregulation? or more desirable self-control use?

the socioeconomics of cancer --

Increased Efficiency/Automaticity

    Automaticity increases with experience or practice in different ways, including time, energy, and space. Reading, for example, becomes faster with experience (time) and less effortful (energy). As automaticity develops, tradeoffs occur across these three, and motivational dynamics determine different rates of development. Someone pressed for time may show a faster rate of development in reading speed, for instance. 

Ironic relief - During times of overly-high heart activity, additional psychological stimulation (e.g., music, social activity, positive stress) might alleviate stress incurred and harmful symptomology, producing a state of ironic relief (ironic because it is a process in which the harmful effects of high metbolic activity are alleviated by increased metabolic demand). Headphones with dope beats could be the next panacea for heart attacks.


Cancer as caused by low metabolite availability, sudden & strong call for increased metabolites, and low metabolic processing capability - Harmful or unhealthy states may result from the following metabolic process: 1) Low metabolite availability (e.g., hypoglycemia) 2) Sudden call for large amount of metabolites (e.g., stress response) 3) Low metabolic processing capability (e.g., lack of structure associated with atypical genes or genes that undermine metabolic processing). Cancer might be one example of such a process, suggested because stress or other responses increase the need for metbolites.

Corresponding and incongruent metabolic activity - Metabolic activity occurs in the body and the brain, and certain metabolic activities may be congruent or incongruent with others. A particular emotional state, for example, may entail low brain activity (e.g., lethargy). During a lethargic state, the heart might be highly active, a pattern of metabolic activity that would be incongruent with the metabolic pattern of the brain. The congruencies and incongruencies of metabolic activity throughout the brain and body might have important influences on psychology.

The depleting imagination and impossible impossibilities - There is actual behavior, and there is imagined behavior, the ideal of the easiest and right path. Imagine a person walking across a room, and the person's path is blocked by furniture so that the path is indirect. The person imagines being able to walk directly, passing through the furniture, yet the actual behavior that occurs is walking around the furniture. The extent to which an imagined behavior (walking through furniture) diverges from actual behavior (walking around the furniture) is hypothesized to be a process of depleting metabolism, in which an increased amount of metabolites are used given t (a period of time).


Convergence of meaning - People are meaning makers, though the meanings they infer are not always the same, and they can differ in how many meanings one interprets for any given situation. The extent to which meaning converges among multiple people can be explained partly by the number of people present. With few people present (e.g., 1, 2, or 3 people), meaning is highly converged, with most people inferring similar meanings. As the number of people increase (e.g., to 45), the convergence of meaning is reduced. As the number of people increases further, meaning becomes increasingly converged upon, with the divergence in meanings being reduced. A sort of U-shaped curve therefore describes the convergence of meaning as a function of the number of people inferring meaning from the same events and stimuli.

The number of words in vocabulary and happiness - People might be happier when they have to remember and use fewer words. Freed up metabolic processes in the brain, that no longer have to remember and use space in the brain for redundant or needless words might increase happiness by allowing for additional metabolism to go to other mental activities. Rather than remember certain words or phrases, a person might more happily enjoy gardening.


Social echoes - A causal factor can at times seem to be causal when it in actuality another factor is causal. For example, a cat might jump away from a car, responding to the approaching presence of the car, in response to the noise of a shoe squeak from the another direction. In many cases it might be that they are increasing the causality of another factor (that inluences psychology), such as by increasing (influencing) their effects, the speed at which they occur, or when they occur. The shoe squeak may have increased the cat's psychological focus on the car, the speed at which the cat turned its attention to the car, or when the cat looked at the car. In this way, it seems that we respond to one stimulus or set of stimuli when we actually are responding to others, although people do not necessarily behave like cats. Many psychological effects might actually influence thought and behavior by catalyzing ongoing psychological processes, rather than affecting them directly. Ironically, our reactions to social situations can be echoes of our reactions to events increasingly disappearing from our psychological world.

Hallucinations explained by overlapping processes -

    Overlapping conscious and unconscious factors - Imagine walking down the street and seeing two images at the same time - a reflection of a person in a window and an approaching mailbox. Instead of seeing a mailbox, you might imagine seeing a person, perhaps some combination of person and a mailbox. It is hypothesized that hallucinations might occur in this way. Hallucinations occuring in this way might occur most often when one or more stimuli are processed unconsciously, such as the reflection of the person in the window occuring outside of conscious attention. 

Hallucinations might occur most often during times when the brain lacks adequate metabolites or specific metabolites, such as when a person is tired or mentally depleted. The hallucionations might therefore occur because different brain processes overlap (e.g., the processing of the mailbox and person) Research questions -

     Which stimuli does the hallucination most closely resemble? The stimuli processed consciously or unconsciously? 
    Overlapping visual and physical processes - A person, consciously or unconsciously seeing a truck approaching from down the street, might hallucinate by thinking that he or she is physically shaking when, in actuality, the person is not shaking. Hallucinations might occur when visual and motor processes overlap. The overlapping might occur due to insufficient, low metabolite availability or to specific metabolites lacking. 


Mental devotion and brain region size - Processes (e.g., abilities), events (e.g., a party), stimuli (e.g., a store) that receive more mental devotion (e.g., have stronger effects on the person, are thought about more) also take up more space in the brain. Examples - Piano players Increased size of brain areas used for piano playing Birds Increased size of brain areas used for singing and song production, relative to non-singing birds and other non-singing animals. Hypotheses - More meaningful eras (e.g., 'the 70's') use more space in the brain than less meaningful or psychologically impactful times.

         -  Meaningfulness tends to be limited. A fan of one sport (e.g., soccer) often prefers or finds more meaningful that sport than another. If meaningfulness entails increased occupation of brain space, then finding meaning in one sport would reduce unused brain space, thereby reducing the likelihood that meaning would be found in another sport. 

Social communication is a fundamental need - Communicating to others, such as by talking, is a need. It is a disposition that arises naturally and normally, and its blockage should therefore have harmful effects on th person, such as preventing a metabolic process from unfolding, much like preventing a runner from running by holding the runner back can create harmful stress or increase the likelihood of injury.

Metabolism and love - The experience or feeling of love might partly substitute for metabolic energy, as if a phenomenological experience can substitute for an actual physical or biological substance. Positive affect, which is central to love, replenishes self-control, as does metabolic energy, suggesting that positive affect provides metabolism. During times of stress, the opposite of love, people eat more, and relationship breakups tend to increase eating. Hatred or anger seems to be a high-energy response that might use more metabolism. Love might provide metabolism - seemingly out of thin air - because maintaining and pursuing goals requires metabolism. Relinquishing the pursuit of love upon obtaining love should therefore relinquish metabolic processes underlying the pursuit of love. Love might alter arousal levels or metabolic rates, perhaps leading to a more efficient or less energy-demanding metabolic state. One function of relationships is to provide metabolism (e.g., the caregiver brings food home to the family), and so love should signal that metabolic resources are incoming or more easily obtained, thereby reducing the drive or need for metabolism. The pleasant experience of love might replace the need or desire for the pleasant experience of eating. Another possibility is that love might increase biological activity in reproductive organs and decrease activity in other organs or body parts (e.g., the legs might walk to help one find love, and love is perceived in part by the legs as increased activity in the testes or ovaries, thereby signaling to the legs that they need to walk less, ultimately conserving metabolic energy). Hypotheses include that love should reduce tendencies to eat and might be most beneficial during times of metabolic scarcity.

Enacting successful self-control or self-change - Changing the self often requires changing the environment. Self-control or self-change involves metabolism, and so factors that influence metabolism could potentially help with self-control or self-change. Factors influencing metabolism include the amount of calories consumed, types and amounts of vitamins and minerals consumed, and air content inhaled (e.g., breathing supplementary oxygen).

Difficulties with conservation - Conserving resources can be important, but many factors make increased conservation problematic. One factor might be the need to contribute to the group. When resources are conserved, employment opportunities are decreased, and group contribution is made more difficult.

Ironic effects of dietary goals - Setting a goal should increase desires for resources that help achieve that goal. Meeting goals entails using metabolites, and therefore setting goals might often entail obtaining metabolites. In the case of dietary goals, people often set a goal of eating less, but accomplishing this goal requires metabolites. Desiring to eat less might therefore activate the goal to increase metabolites (i.e., take in more calories), which is the opposite of the dietary goal. Dietary goals should be more likely to fail as a result of this process.

Forms of Self-Esteem Might Fluctuate with Glucose Availability - To the extent that a form of self-esteem is effortfully maintained, then its level might fluctuate with glucose availability (e.g., periphery glucose levels, time until mealtime, food stores in pantry). One sample of participants might include people who already regularly assess their glucose levels (e.g., people with diabetes), so that they would only have to rate their self-esteem periodically so as to participate.

Reduce driving accidents involving alcohol - Placing candles and warming devices at bars at which drunken patrons can increase warmth reduces metabolic load of thermoregulation, freeing metabolites that might benefit driving performance, reducing the incident of drunk driving accidents. Drunken patrons warming at bars and drinking locales might decrease the likelihood of accidents from drunk driving. This effect should occur only among patrons for whom increased warmth would reduce metabolite use or caloric-energy expenditure (and for whom the increased non-used metabolites or calories would improve driving performance). The effect of candles and warming devices among patrons for whom decreased warmth would reduce metabolite use or caloric-energy use is unclear from this hypothesis. Warming devices might include gloves, candles, heaters, fireplaces, rubbing hands together, putting hands in pockets, and sitting on hands.

    - Future testable hypotheses
        * Do people who would be less likely to get in traffic accidents tend to use these warming devices when they would be less likely to get in traffic accidents?

Glucose Intolerance and Brain Activity - Glucose intolerance or impaired glucose tolerance(i.e., when glucose remains in the bloodstream rather than being absorbed by cells) can be attributable to brain regions being deprived of glucose. The extent of glucose intolerance or impaired glucose tolerance therefore might be related to the extent to which one or more brain areas are being deprived of glucose.

Manipulating Time and Effort - Doing some things takes more effort than others, and it can often seem like time slows while exerting effort. Time flies when you’re having fun, but not when you’re exerting strenuous effort. Might perceptions of time passage influence effort? If someone thought time was progressing at a different rate than it was, would this influence feelings of exerting effort? If the clock at work was off and made the hour 15 minutes shorter, then perhaps workers might have felt less drained or fatigued by the work. People might use the rate at which time passes as a cue as to how much effort they exert. Various projects related to this general idea can be pursued, such as manipulating how long people think a task took and then assessing perceptions of effort exerted and fatigue, as well as performance on a later task as a behavioral measure of fatigue.

Happiness and Efficiency of Movement - The happy state is an energetic state. Happiness represents having free energy to expend as one wishes – such as after having met prior goals and having few or no task demands. Emotions are signaled to others, so how do people signal the energetic feelings of happiness? One possibility is that they walk, run, stand, and move in ways that take more energy, such as by swinging their hands higher in the air or picking their feet up high above the steps. One project is to test these possibilities.

The Semantics of Energy – Good vs. Bad - Energy is an important construct in psychology. Psychological states often are defined by whether they connote having energy (e.g., feeling energetic or happy) or lacking energy (e.g., feeling tired or sad). People also need metabolic energy (foodstuffs) to function. Perhaps words related to energy – as used in language – have meaningful links to broad psychological domains. In this project, it is proposed that ‘energy’ relates to the ideas of good and bad. That which connotes having energy is good, and that which connotes lacking energy or depleting energy is bad. Objects that are up (e.g., an apple on a tree) have more potential mechanical energy than objects that are down (e.g., an apple on the ground), and ‘up’ might have more positive connotations than ‘down’. Light (e.g., the sun) contains more energy than dark (e.g., the vacuum of outer space), and ‘light’ might have more positive connotations than ‘dark’. Studies involve examining the link between energy and good vs. bad in language.

Observational Learning and Efficiency - Humans readily observe others so as to learn how to perform behaviors, such as a tourist watching people buy a train ticket so as to learn how to buy a ticket. It has been assumed that observational learning occurs because it is a fast and efficient means of learning. Rather than recreate the wheel, one can watch others create a wheel. If observational learning occurs readily in part because of its efficiency, then perhaps people more readily pay attention to people who model efficient behaviors than inefficient behaviors. Children might pay closer attention to adults who tie their shoes efficiently than adults who tie their shoes inefficiently, and people learning how to lock their bikes might pay closer attention to someone who locks the bike efficiently than inefficiently. Studies under this umbrella could involve modeling both efficient and inefficient behaviors and examining which are more readily mimicked or repeated.

Distance Perception and Meaning - The physical distance between a person and an object may be fixed in physical terms (at least at the macrolevel) but not in psychological terms. An approaching tram might be 10 meters from a bicyclist riding on the tracks, but the tram can seem much closer than 10 meters to that bicyclist. What factors influence the perceived distance between one’s self and an object? Studies proposed in this project could examine whether meaning or meaningfulness makes objects appear closer than they are. A sign with words on it might seem closer than a sign without words (meaning), or a sign that is relevant to the self might seem closer than a sign that is irrelevant to the self (meaningfulness).

Distance Perception and Time- The physical distance between a person and an object may be fixed in physical terms (at least at the macrolevel) but not in psychological terms. An approaching tram might be 10 meters from a bicyclist riding on the tracks, but the tram can seem much closer than 10 meters to that bicyclist. What factors influence the perceived distance between one’s self and an object? Studies proposed in this project could examine whether the possession of time influences distance perception. When in a rush or hurry, objects appear farther or closer away. The train might appear father away to the rushed commuter than the commuter who has plenty of time to reach the train.

The Power of the Female Sex Drive - On average, women can more easily obtain sex from men than men can obtain sex from women. This idea led to the theory of sexual economics, in which the female sex drive functions as a resource that is exchanged for other meaningful resources, such as attention, emotional concern, money, and material goods. From this view, the female sex drive operates as a reward for certain behaviors and therefore might function to regulate work in society. When a certain form of work is scarce and desirable (e.g., musical, athletic, or intellectual abilities), women will find these forms of work increasingly sexually appealing. Conversely, people who perform forms of work that are less needed will be seen as less sexually desirable. Cues to the amount of work required in society might also influence the female sex drive – when life requires high degrees of work, women will become less sexually promiscuous. When life requires less work, women will become more promiscuous.

The Anxiety of Life and Death - Ernest Becker (1973) proposed that people are highly motivated to avoid death psychologically and physically, and that much of life can be viewed as avoiding the anxiety that thoughts of death evoke. People socialize with others, participate in culture, and strive to meet their most important goals so as to avoid thinking about death. Though death has the potential to evoke anxiety, so too might the idea of living life in ways that diverge from how one believes life ought to be lived. It can be terrifying to die, but it can also be terrifying to live a life in disharmony with one’s innermost values and beliefs. Ample evidence indicates that thoughts of death make people bolster support for their most cherished values and beliefs and respond negatively to those who threaten those values and beliefs. The same might hold true for the thought of being forced to live how one does not want to live. In this case, people might respond by bolstering support for their own values and beliefs.

How Space Makes Us Eat More or Less - When people start and stop eating is often controlled by external factors outside of ourselves. The size of the container, the time on the clock, and whether others are eating can all be cues that regulate the amount of food we eat. Another factor that might dictate our eating behavior is the amount of space in which we have to move. If space is generally limited, and people must move in small spaces throughout the day and move around obstacles, then eating too much food can be cumbersome – it limits the ability to move freely. Thus, people should eat less. If space is ample, and people have plenty of room to move around, then there is less reason to limit one’s eating so as to remain highly mobile. Studies can be designed to test this hypothesis, such as by having people move through small spaces and then examine how much food they eat, or by having people eat in smaller spaces. This work holds the potential to reduce the amount of food eaten by people who eat too much and hope to eat less, which might ultimately provide food to those who need and want it more.

Insomnia and implementation intentions - During insomnia, people form implementation intentions (e.g., If I cannot sleep, then I will do laundry) that reduce the likelihood of sleeping by activating a monitoring process (that searches for the 'if' component of the implementation intention). The monitoring process itself entails increased brain activation that opposes changes in activation required for sleep.

The Work Heuristic - Individuals work more in high-work cultures (e.g., cultures in which people work longer hours) than in low-work cultures. The proposed 'work heuristic' is that the extent to which people work in the surrounding social environment (e.g., the length of the average work week, the amount of vacation time) serves as a mental guideline as to how much work one should put into any given task or role. For example, in a high work culture, police officers might develop the heuristic that they should put more effort into enforcing laws (e.g., make more arrests) and reviewers for journal articles might feel the need to work more on reviews (e.g., provide more comments, think of more potential problems), compared to similar people in low work cultures. The 'work heuristic' might help reduce guilt and other negative feelings (e.g., feeling as though one does not contribute to the group) that would result from working less in a given culture than is normative.

Serotonin c6h12n2o Dopamine c8h11no2 GABA c4h9no2 Glutamate c5h9no4

Methodology

Helping / Prosocial behavior - Assess helping / prosocial behavior for people in need of help / prosocial behavior

Nutritional Intake - A socially beneficial and experimentally simple way of assessing the effects of nutritional intake would be to provide free food in locations in which nutritional intake is inadequate, allowing people to walk over and take food while participating in a study. The food could be provided by people who would benefit from the act of giving food, such as the lonely chef.

Metabolism Applied to Psychological Terms

Hypothesis - Something about metabolism.

Belongingness - benefits of - provides metabolism.

Metabolism - Referring to the use of potential and/or usable metabolites.

Metabolite use - The dissipation of metabolites across time and space.

Need to belong - Intertwined with the need for metabolites.

Social norms - Both decrease (conserve) metabolites and increase metabolite use. Riding a bike on a sidewalk (norm) decreases metabolic use (norm conserves metabolites), but if the sidewalk provides an indirect route, riding a bike on the sidewalk (norm) can increase metabolite use. Whether, and the extent to which, the norm increases or decreases metabolite use would vary also with the functionality of the bike (e.g., the extent to which the bike is entropized) and sidewalk (e.g., the extent to which the sidewalk creates friction with the bike tire).





Inquiries

From the Somadendritic synapse to the molecular

     The tripartite synapse: roles for gliotransmission in health and disease. Trends in Molecular Medicine, 13, 54-63.
   This article may relate to TMT both for health, and perhaps in a metaphorical sense. 
         See:
           Metabolism
           Pentose Phosphate Pathway
           Preorbitalfrontal cortex
           Hypothalamus
           Liver
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